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Abstract 
 
The way that countries engage in conflict with each other has dramatically 
changed over the past decade. Countries are more frequently clashing on the economic 
front than in violent direct conflict. The United States’ weakened position in the global 
economy after the 2008 financial crisis places the country at a disadvantage in this new 
era of hybrid warfare. Sovereign wealth funds (SWFs), which are created to achieve both 
the political and economic goals, are becoming a prominent player in the international 
arena.  This thesis assesses the risk SWFs pose to the US by examining the Russian, 
Chinese, and Saudi Arabian SWFs.  
Past examinations of SWFs before the 2008 financial crisis determined SWFs did 
not act geopolitically. However, the three case studies demonstrate that some SWFs have 
been increasingly pursuing both global economic and political objectives because they 
lack independence from government. Moreover, each SWF poses a different level to the 
US depending on whether the home country is an ally or adversary. Additionally, 
regulations of SWFs are inadequate to address the growing threat to the US; international 
law lacks an enforcement mechanism and domestic regulation depends on the president 
for action. These findings imply that while SWFs can benefit the US economy by 
providing capital to US companies, the US needs more effective regulation to address the 
risks they pose to US national and economic security. This thesis recommends 
amendments to domestic and international regulation in order to mitigate the risks that 
SWFs pose without creating additional barriers to foreign investment in the US.  
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Chapter 1: Introduction  
 
“Should we be concerned that the governments of Russia and China control billions of 
dollars in assets and invest directly in US institutions and companies?” 
- Senator Joe Biden, Senate Foreign Relations Committee Hearing on Sovereign 
Wealth Funds, 2008.  
 
1.1 Introduction 
Foreign direct investment (FDI) in the United States (US) caused major national 
concern during the 1980s. Japanese companies purchased prominent US assets, like the 
Rockefeller Center and Universal Studios, in a buying spree. Some worried Japan would 
acquire critical US assets, challenging the US’s global economic dominance.1 Japan’s 
business ties came under scrutiny for a geopolitical reason as well; the Japanese machine 
company, Toshiba, sold “militarily sensitive technology” that made submarines quieter to 
the Soviet Union in the midst of the Cold War.2 In response to the sale, members of the 
House of Representatives held a press conference on the steps of the Capitol, where they 
smashed a Toshiba radio with a sledgehammer, symbolizing disdain for the company.3 
The Japanese government responded quickly to US outrage by condemning Toshiba and 
vowing to tighten export controls. Toshiba sent an apology letter to Congress and two top 
company officials resigned. Japan could not afford to provoke US protectionist policies 
because the US was Japan’s most important foreign market. American fears of an 
                                               
1 United States. Congress. Senate. Committee on Foreign Relations. 2008. Sovereign Wealth Funds: 
Foreign Policy Consequences in an Era of New Money: Hearing Before the Committee on Foreign 
Relations, United States Senate, One Hundred Tenth Congress, Second Session, June 11, 2008. S. Hrg, 
110-765. Washington: U.S. G.P.O.   
2 Susan Chira, Japan’s Efforts to Soften U.S. Anger on Toshiba. The New York Times, July 18, 1987.  
3 George R Packard, “The Coming U.S.-Japan Crisis,” Foreign Affairs 66, no.2 (1987), doi: 
10.2307/20043377.   
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economic challenge from Japan never materialized. Following the fall of the Soviet 
Union in the early 1990s, the US sustained hegemonic power in the global economy.  
Demonstrated by the election of Donald Trump in 2016 and his administration’s 
subsequent protectionist economic policies, the US has renewed concerns regarding FDI 
and its dominance in the global economy. After the 2008 financial crisis, the international 
political economy appears to be transitioning power away from US influence. The rising 
economies of developing countries with vast natural resources, especially oil, or massive 
commodity markets, produced current account surpluses in those countries. The US 
sharply contrasts with these states as it sustains its large current account deficit through 
the privileged position of the US dollar (USD) in the global economic system as the 
dominant reserve currency.4 The weakened state of the USD and the US economy after 
the 2008 crisis further emphasized the difference between the two. Emerging markets 
increasingly channel their current account surpluses into sovereign wealth funds (SWFs): 
state-owned investment vehicles that look to invest at home and abroad. Investment from 
SWFs in the US triggers similar challenges to the US’s hegemonic power in the global 
economy and concerns of geopolitically motivated investments as the Japanese FDI crisis 
in the 1980s.  
Similar to policymakers’ worries in 1980, the accelerated growth in SWF 
investment power represents a shift in economic power from the West to the East. But the 
threat of SWF investment in the US presents a different level of risk to the US than 
private foreign investment from Japan did in the 1980s.  While both obtain access to US 
                                               
4 Barry J. Eichengreen, Exorbitant Privilege: The Decline of the Dollar and the Future of the International 
Monetary System (New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 2011).   
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markets through FDI, they diverge because governments own SWFs. The rise of these 
state-owned enterprises (SOEs) threatens the consensus on neoliberal principles in the 
global economy, like the importance of the private sector as an engine for growth. 
Furthermore, the increased incidence of economic and political hybrid warfare creates an 
additional threat to the US if foreign governments use SWFs to achieve geopolitical 
goals. 
Solutions employed during the Japan FDI crisis are not compatible with the 
current international system. The US is in a weaker position in the international system 
than before the 2008 crisis. Emerging markets are beginning to look to invest closer to 
home and are less dependent on the US market. Protectionist policies under the Trump 
Administration aim to fight back against the shift in economic power away from the US 
by attempting to reduce its current account deficit. But by enacting these policies, the US 
might be causing itself more harm. Herein lies the Catch-22 of SWF regulation. By not 
regulating them enough, the US leaves itself vulnerable to the economic and national 
security threats of the funds. However, if the US regulates SWFs too much, it becomes 
cut off from an enormous source of capital it benefits from. Finding a balance between 
the two extremes requires assessing the risk SWFs pose to US economic and national 
security and crafting measured responses.  
 
1.2 Motivation 
Research on SWFs determined they were not a pressing geopolitical threat to 
Western nations. After their role providing capital to insolvent US and Western financial 
institutions during the global financial crisis, the West considered SWFs stabilizing 
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forces in the global economy.  However, most of this research was conducted 
immediately after the crisis, and since then, the international landscape has changed. 
National security threats to the US have dramatically shifted. Countries are less likely to 
break out into violent direct combat with one another. Rather cyber-attacks, economic 
leverage, and the accumulation of power are now the prominent forms of engaging in 
global conflict. Terrorism no longer poses the greatest threat to the US; stories of Russia 
meddling in the 2016 US elections, a trade war with China, and the murder of journalist 
Jamal Khashoggi in the Saudi Arabian embassy constitutes the salient national security 
threats. SWFs, which are created at the intersection of the political and economic goals of 
a country, are growing in strength and playing a role in the changing national and 
economic security threats. A reevaluation of SWFs is necessary due to the transformed 
international environment and the rise of hybrid warfare.   
 
1.3 Background  
Definition of Sovereign Wealth Funds 
A simple definition of sovereign wealth funds is that they are investment funds 
owned by governments. Definitions of SWFs are so broad and flexible that it is hard to 
pinpoint one universal definition that fits all SWFs. The US Treasury Department defines 
a SWF as “a government investment vehicle which is funded by foreign reserve assets, 
and which manages those assets separately from the official reserves of the monetary 
authorities (the central bank and reserve-related functions of a finance ministry or 
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national treasury office).” SWFs are also more straightforwardly defined as “government-
controlled pools of assets designed to engage primarily in foreign portfolio investment.”5 
SWFs can take several different forms, such as stabilization funds, savings funds, 
reserve investment corporations, pension reserve funds, and development funds.6 There 
are typically five main features of sovereign wealth funds: independence from 
government, high exposure to foreign currency, no explicit liabilities, tolerance of highly 
risky behavior, and a long-term investment period.7 Investment from state-owned 
vehicles is much more likely to come from developing countries.8 The charts below 
demonstrate that while SWFs are spread throughout the world, SWF assets under 
management are concentrated in emerging markets such as Asia and the Middle East. 
 
                                               
5 S., Sovereign Wealth Funds, 15.  
6 Peter Bruce-Clark and Ashby H.B Monk, “Sovereign Development Funds,” in The Oxford Handbook of 
Sovereign Wealth Funds, ed. Douglas J. Cumming, Geoffrey Wood, Igor Filatotchev, and Juliane Reinecke 
(Oxford University Press, 2018).  
7 Jan Ander and Petr Teplý, Sovereign Wealth Funds in Theory and Practice (Prague: Karolinum Press, 
2014).  
8 S., Sovereign Wealth Funds, 20.    
9 
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Because SWFs assets under management are overwhelmingly concentrated in 
Asia and the Middle East, the interdependence of the US economy and the Middle East 
and Pacific Rim regions are compounded by these funds. SWF assets have grown rapidly 
over the last few decades due to the increase in commodity prices and trade surpluses.9 
Countries capitalize their SWFs from balance of payments surpluses, foreign currency 
operations, privatization proceeds, fiscal surpluses, and receipts from commodity 
exports.10 They diverge from the historical investments of sovereign wealth that were in 
low-risk assets such as US treasuries. As a relatively newly popular financial innovation, 
SWFs largely go unnoticed to the general public.  
 
Function 
Kuwait founded the first SWF in 1953 in order to invest oil revenue surpluses.11 
Economies dependent on natural resources, primarily oil, originally used SWFs as a 
stabilization mechanism. Investing wealth from natural resources protected national 
economies from external shocks, such as windfall oil prices.12 Non-commodity SWFs, 
like that of China, obtain funding through trade surpluses from positive net exports.13 
Holding government reserves is costly because of the difference in what reserves yield 
                                               
9 Thomas N. Carson and William P. Litmann, Sovereign Wealth Funds (New York: Nova Science 
Publishers, 2009). 
10 Bruce-Clark and Monk, 66.  
11 Ander and Teplý, 17.  
12 Douglas Cummings, et al., “Introducing Sovereign Wealth Funds” in The Oxford Handbook on 
Sovereign Wealth Funds (New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 2018).   
13 Udaibir S. Das, et al., eds., Economics of Sovereign Wealth Funds: Issues for Policymakers (Washington, 
D.C.: International Monetary Fund, 2010).  
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and the interest cost on domestic debt.14 SWFs allow countries to transform sovereign 
wealth into financial assets.15 Reserves held in financial assets can still be mobilized 
quickly to defend, engage, or stabilize domestic policies or institutions in case of 
government deficits or external shocks.16 Natural resources are not infinite. Eventually, 
those resources will become depleted and economies dependent on those resources will 
be at risk. Investing abroad provides countries with an avenue to accumulate a rainy day 
fund for when those resources are depleted. It also helps countries develop or diversify 
their economies by acquiring new technology and jobs through their investments. In 
summary, SWFs are utilized as a safeguard in the event of global market conditions that 
would threaten home countries’ economies.17  
 
1.4 Structure of the Study  
This thesis assesses the risk that SWFs pose to the US by examining the Russian, 
Chinese, and Saudi Arabian SWFs and makes policy recommendations to address those 
risks. First, in Chapter 2, the national and economic security threat of SWFs will be 
appraised as well as the probability of the realization of those threats. Current regulation 
of SWFs will also be analyzed in Chapter 2. In Chapter 3, the Russian SWFs and the 
threats they pose to the US will be examined. The Russian funds’ structure, transparency, 
compliance with rules, geopolitical actions, and investment in a US transportation firm 
(Hyperloop) will be discussed. Next, in Chapter 4, a case study of the Chinese SWF will 
                                               
14 Gordon L. Clark, Ashby H. B. Monk, and Adam D. Dixon, Sovereign Wealth Funds: Legitimacy, 
Governance, and Global Power (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2013). 
15 Clark, Monk, and Dixon, 16.  
16 Clark, Monk, and Dixon.  
17 Clark, Monk, and Dixon.  
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demonstrate different threats that SWFs can pose. The background of the fund, 
transparency and compliance with rules, role in the 2008 financial crisis, geopolitical 
actions, and US investments provide evidence of these threats. The third case study in 
Chapter 5 will focus on the Saudi Arabian SWF’s newly revised mandate and its 
implications for the US. Finally, in Chapter 6, policy recommendations of how to most 
effectively mitigate the demonstrated threats will be presented. The commonalities 
throughout the case studies will be identified and addressed through modified domestic 
and international regulation.  
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Chapter 2:  Threat Analysis of Sovereign Wealth Funds  
2.1 Introduction  
The potential threat that sovereign wealth funds pose came to global attention in 
2007 despite the existence of SWFs since 1953. Heightened scrutiny occurred partly 
because of the creation of funds in Russia and China, two traditionally geopolitical US 
rivals. Additionally, investments by SWFs into US financial institutions during the 2008 
financial crisis brought attention to their potential economic destabilizing effects. During 
the 2008 presidential election, Barack Obama voiced his concern over SWFs stating, “I 
am concerned if these … sovereign wealth funds are motivated by more than just market 
considerations, and that’s obviously a possibility.”18 The emergence of SWFs into the 
national political debate in the US signaled public anxiety over the funds.  
The literature on SWFs identifies two types of threats SWFs pose to host 
countries: economic and national security threats. Experts trace economic threats to the 
amount of assets SWFs control and their potential destabilizing effects. Some 
contributors to the literature on SWFs reject this threat because by investing in the US, 
SWFs tie their success to the economic prosperity and political stability of the country. 
Yet, host countries, especially the US, also worry that the SWFs could become vehicles 
for the advancement of home country political agendas.19 SWFs’ tendency to perform 
worse than comparable private investors is pointed to as evidence of political influence 
                                               
18 Jeff Mason, “Obama Says Concerned About Sovereign Wealth Funds,” Reuters, February 7, 2008, 
Accessed March 3, 2019. https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-sovereignwealth-obama/obama-says-
concerned-about-sovereign-wealth-funds-idUSN0742347120080208.  
19 Thomas A. Hemphill, “Sovereign Wealth Funds: National Security Risks in a Global Free Trade 
Environment,” Thunderbird International Business Review 51, no.6 (2009): 551-566.  
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and poor governance.20 Furthermore, most of the literature acknowledges their potential 
to act strategically as well as destabilize the global economic system.  
Two perceptions of SWFs are common within the global community. The first 
regards sovereign wealth funds as “saviors” during hard economic times, using their 
actions during the 2008 financial crisis as evidence.21 For example, some in the European 
Union have embraced SWFs and their flows of capital into the region.22 The other 
perception views SWFs as the “new barbarians at the gate.”23 SWFs as a threat to security 
has been pervasive in the US.  Between 2007 and 2008 international guidelines for the 
operation of SWFs, called the Santiago Principles, were created. During the negotiations 
of the Santiago Principles, many US officials voiced concerns about SWFs. In his 2008 
threat assessment, the US director of National Intelligence J. Michael McConnell stated, 
“[There are] concerns about the financial capabilities of Russia, China, and OPEC 
countries and the potential use of their market access to exert financial leverage to gain 
political ends.”24 The public ownership of SWFs increases both the worry from host 
countries and the necessity for greater accountability than private financial institutions.25 
Concern from the federal government also stems from SWFs’ status as an unfamiliar 
                                               
20 Cummings et al., 3.  
21 Charlie McCreevy, "The Credit Crisis and Its Aftermath," (speech, Society of Business Economists, 
London, February 6, 2008).  
22 Mark Thatcher, National Policies Towards Sovereign Wealth Funds in Europe: A Comparison of 
France, Germany and Italy,” policy brief, Kuwait Programme on Development, Governance and 
Globalisation in the Gulf States, London School of Economics, 2013.  
23 Mark Kleinman, "The $2.5 Trillion Wave of Cash Heading Our Way," The Telegraph, July 15, 2007, 
accessed 18 February 18, 2019, https://www.telegraph.co.uk/finance/migrationtemp/2812150/The-2.5-
trillion-wave-of-cash-heading-our-way.html.  
24 Edwin M. Truman, “Sovereign Wealth Funds: Threat or Salvation?” Peterson Institute for International 
Economics, 2010. 
25 Das et al., 61.  
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entity.26 A few US states adopted stabilization funds (Alaska, Texas, North Dakota, 
Alabama, Colorado and Wyoming) but there is no US SWF. The 2008 Senate hearings on 
SWFs conclude that while SWFs can provide vast economic benefits to the US, they also 
pose a sizable threat to the stability of the US economy.  
 This chapter aims to assess the threats that SWFs currently pose to the US. First, 
it will explore SWFs in international relations theory. Second, this chapter will assess the 
economic threat from SWFs by discussing the shift in economic power that SWFs 
represent, SWFs’ potential to be destabilizing, and risks emerging from the size of SWFs 
and their lack of transparency. Third, the national security threats of SWFs, geopolitical 
use and targeting strategic sectors will be analyzed. Then current domestic and 
international regulations will be evaluated. Finally, the probability of the realization of 
the threats examined will be considered.   
 
2.2 SWFs in International Relations Theory 
In the classical realist theory of power in international relations states pursue 
policies that maximize their power in all arenas, including the economy.27 Waltz notes 
that the international system is anarchic, and states seek to maximize their power to 
protect their security in such a system.28 States increase their power relative to others 
either externally or internally. Externally, states strengthen alliances or weaken others.29 
                                               
26 Kathryn Lavelle, “Sovereign Wealth Funds and Foreign Policy,” in The Oxford Handbook of Sovereign 
Wealth Funds, ed. Douglas J. Cumming, Geoffrey Wood, Igor Filatotchev, and Juliane Reinecke (Oxford 
University Press, 2018). 
27 Manda Shemirani, Sovereign Wealth Funds and International Political Economy (London: Routledge, 
2016).  
28 Kenneth N. Waltz, Theory of International Politics (Addison-Wesley Publishing Company, 1979).  
29 Waltz, 53.  
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SWFs externally increase the power of home countries through SWFs by forming 
alliances with other SWFs and home countries using SWFs to increase their influence in 
those countries.30 Alliances between SWFs also increase the size and power of both 
members of the partnership. SWFs contribute primarily to internal maximization of 
power through increasing the stability and performance of the home economy. A SWF 
allows the home country to invest more domestically and ensure future domestic 
economic stability. Globalization allows SWFs to increase their home country’s power by 
acquiring resources outside of its borders. When SWFs acquire portions of industries or 
economic sectors, host countries lose part of their power to the home country of the SWF. 
Because some SWFs manage more assets than others and some states do not have an 
SWF, some states are able to obtain more economic resources than others. As a result, 
prominent home countries increase their power in the international system through SWF 
investment.  
The second theory characterizes SWFs as capitalist economic agents.31 Within 
this theory, SWFs pursue commercial objectives and investment in the US because of the 
opportunity to achieve a higher yield.32 SWFs act as entrepreneurs through their use of 
global opportunities to reap a profit. According to this theory, SWFs do not act 
geopolitically or politically. Consequently, SWFs pose a primarily economic threat if 
they rapidly remove their capital from the US during financial distress due to the low 
yield of those investments. 
                                               
30 Ashley T. Lenihan, “Sovereign Wealth Funds and the Acquisition of Power,” New Political Power 19, 
no.2 (2014): 227-257.  
31 Shemirani, 23.  
32 Shemirani, 23.  
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 Lastly, SWFs are theorized as a way of compensating society for structural 
deficiencies, acting as a mechanism for redistribution.33 This theory is primarily inward 
faced, as it describes a domestically politically motivated actor. Therefore, the domestic 
compensation theory for SWFs can explain the political motivations behind SWFs. Home 
governments can use SWF funds to give constituencies handouts, enact social programs, 
or balance fiscal deficits in order to ensure support for the current government.34 Each 
classification of SWF motivations illustrates different threats of the funds. Variation in 
the type and degree of threat that each SWF presents to the US emphasizes the need to 
examine each fund individually to determine the threat that SWF investments pose.  
 
2.3 Economic Threats 
A Shift in Economic Power 
The vast amount of assets that SWFs control represents a shift in economic and 
financial power away from the West.35 The emergence of a Chinese SWF, in particular, 
spurred worry from Western countries about the continued pervasiveness of neoliberal 
ideas in the global economy.36 China, as a large player in the global economy, adopting a 
state-owned investment vehicle to make investments and spread its influence abroad 
challenges the validity of private markets as the driver of economic growth.  
The US economic ideology is built on the idea that the economy works best in the 
absence of government control. SWFs can undermine the Western market structure as 
                                               
33 Shemirani, 23. 
34 Shemirani, 23.  
35 Truman, 2.    
36 Truman.  
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well as the global consensus on the benefits of free markets. SWFs, as government-
controlled investment bodies, challenge open-market principles when they take partial 
ownership of private companies in the US.37 Increased participation of public entities in 
global private markets questions the continued dominance of free private-market ideals. 
With a decrease in free market enthusiasm, a reversal of privatization could be 
triggered.38 
Additionally, SWFs are symbolic of the ongoing trade imbalances in the global 
economy. SWFs are managed by countries with large current account surpluses. The US, 
which retains a large current account deficit, demonstrates the problem that host countries 
typically have with trade imbalances; they cannot afford to be too suspicious of SWFs 
because they need capital. Shifts in the capital flow that SWFs partake in is contrary to 
the previous norm that investment flows from the developed world to the developing 
world. Money now flows from Asia and the Middle East to the US and Europe via SWF 
investment.39 The optics of relying on foreign government-controlled funds are not good 
for a supposed hegemon.40  
U.S. policymakers also worry that the accumulation of foreign reserves will 
become a goal for countries who wish to use those reserves for SWF investment. SWFs 
provide the potential for countries to move investment away from US treasuries. Foreign 
investment by finance ministries and central banks was typically constricted to currency 
                                               
37 Robert M. Kimmitt, "Public Footprints in Private Markets; Sovereign Wealth Funds and the World 
Economy." Foreign Affairs, January 2008.  
38 Fabio Bassan, Research Handbook on Sovereign Wealth Funds and International Investment Law, 
(Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar Publishing, 2015).  
39 Eric Anderson, Take the Money and Run: Sovereign Wealth Funds and the Demise of American 
Prosperity, (Westport: Praeger Security International, 2009).  
40 Bhagwati, Jagdish. Statement of Jagdish Bhagwati, Prepared Testimony for the Senate Foreign Relations 
Committee, 11 June 2008. 
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reserves in US treasury bills and other risk-free bonds.41  Countries that possess SWFs 
increase their investment options. SWFs follow different investment strategies than 
central banks typically do, and the shift in foreign exchange reserves to SWFs could 
impact the stability of global capital flows.42 Increasing SWF activity could threaten the 
privileged economic position of the US. 
Additionally, SWFs are increasingly investing in emerging markets that have 
higher yields.43 In the long-term, a move away from investments in US government-
backed assets and the dollar could weaken.44 While this threat to the privileged economic 
position of the US is long-term and only theorized, the threat is large enough to provide 
worry to the US. A study conducted by Beck and Fidora found that a reduction in 
demand for US bonds caused by a reallocation of excess reserves out of US assets would 
trigger a net capital outflow of around US $500 billion.45 A shift in capital flow of that 
size away from the US could substantially threaten US economic power and stability.   
Western countries’ ability to promote democracy fading with the relative decrease 
in the global economic power of countries promoting those values also caused 
apprehension in embracing SWFs. Most of the countries with the largest amount of SWF 
assets are not democracies, like China and the United Arab Emirates.46 International 
investment by these countries increases the potential for penetration of nondemocratic 
                                               
41 Lee Hudson Teslik, “Global Economy in Crisis: Sovereign Wealth Funds,” Council on Foreign 
Relations. January 28, 2009. 
42 Roland Beck and Michael Fidora, “The Impact of Sovereign Wealth Funds on Global Financial 
Markets,” Intereconomics 43, no.6 (2008): 349-384, DOI: 10.1007/s10272-008-0268-5. 
43 Bhagwati.  
44 Teslik.  
45 Das et al., 535.  
46 Truman.  
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ideas by providing an alternative development path.47 Through this process, a shift in 
economic power away from the West threatens the pervasiveness of their ideas in the 
international system. 
 
Destabilization 
 The threat of freely moving international capital can be destabilizing for the US 
economy.48 When large amounts of capital enter a country from abroad, it can cause 
current account distortions for the host country. Furthermore, if that capital is rapidly 
removed from the country, it causes financial instability and currency devaluation in the 
host country. SWFs, as large asset holders, can pose this destabilization threat if they 
remove their investments quickly or make short-term investments. SWFs can also cause 
volatility in the market by simply reinforcing herd behavior by rumored transactions that 
affect the valuations of companies.49 
But SWFs have longer investment horizons than private investors. The funds have 
several motivations to stay with their strategic asset allocations despite short-term 
volatility. It is difficult for SWFs to liquidate their investments within short-term 
horizons because their investments are concentrated in illiquid assets such as private 
equity, real estate, and infrastructure.50 The longevity of SWF investment can be a force 
of stability within the global markets. But due to their lack of transparency and disclosure 
                                               
47 Daniel W. Drezner, The Foreign Policy Implications of Sovereign Wealth Funds. Prepared Testimony 
for the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, June 11, 2008.  
48 Das et al., 61 
49 Das et al., 62.  
50 Sophie Baker, “PwC: Sovereign Wealth Funds Increasing Allocations to Alternatives,” Pensions & 
Investments. January 30, 3018, accessed April 11, 2019, 
https://www.pionline.com/article/20180130/ONLINE/180139985/pwc-sovereign-wealth-funds-increasing-
allocations-to-alternatives. 
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of investments, mere rumors of shifts in SWF investments have the potential to be 
destabilizing to the global economic system.51 
 Because of the long horizons, SWFs can abandon or chose not to invest when its 
investment is most critical.52 Instead of providing stability, SWFs could aggravate 
downward trending financial cycles.53 SWFs played a large role in the 2008 financial 
crisis, rescuing failing US financial institutions such as Merrill Lynch, Citigroup, and 
Morgan Stanley.54 Thus SWFs actions during recessions have the potential to stabilize 
failing firms. Host countries’ reactions to the investments and stock market prices of 
those companies were positive after the economic recovery.55  But if the SWFs had 
instead announced that they were divesting from those financial institutions, it would 
have caused greater instability in the markets.56 Additionally, in 2008, SWFs turned 
down requests from Bear Stearns and Wachovia Bank for critical investments.57 While 
SWFs were hailed as the “Saviors of Wall Street” by the Wall Street Journal after the 
financial crisis, SWF investments in US and European financial institutions did not 
completely save those institutions from incurring great losses.58 SWFs also incurred great 
short-term losses from their investments in 2008 due to the riskiness and volatility of US 
financial institutions. SWFs cannot be relied on to provide stability in the event of 
financial crises.  
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Riskier investments are becoming more common among funds which could 
potentially destabilize international markets.59 SWFs initially favored safer investments 
such as sovereign bonds, but since moved to riskier investments to achieve higher 
yields.60 Riskier investments include investing in equity markets and illiquid assets such 
as real estate.61 Close to half of SWF aggregate assets are now held in risky assets.62 
Since the 2008 financial crisis, SWFs focused their assets in the financial sector.63 SWFs 
investing in the financial sector during the crisis was extremely risky. The continued 
stock market decline of some financial institutions after 2008 negatively affected SWFs 
stakes.64 Furthermore, politically motivated investments could increase risky behavior of 
SWFs and distortion of asset prices.65 Due to the great size of SWFs, their increased risk-
taking behavior could destabilize the economic system because these investments have a 
greater probability of negative returns.  
 
Size of the Funds 
The rapid accumulation of assets by SWFs in aggregate is the source of much 
political anxiety and concern regarding security threats in the US.66  SWFs in aggregate 
hold US $7.6 trillion in assets.67 They play a small role in the global economy when 
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compared to pension funds and endowments which are worth around US $41.3 trillion.68 
But SWFs are large players in the economy when compared to hedge funds. SWFs hold 
more assets than hedge funds, which managed US $2.9 trillion in 2018.69 In the 2008 
financial crisis, culpability for the economic downturn was partly given to hedge funds.70 
SWFs now hold much more assets than hedge funds did in 2008 and their potential for 
global economic destabilization is recognized. Aggregate SWF assets are also extremely 
concentrated in a few firms. Hedge fund assets are spread throughout more than 7000 
firms, whereas there are only around 80 SWFs.71 One destructive SWF, consequently, 
can have a greater negative impact on the global economy than one destructive hedge 
fund.  
Wealth from SWFs is also concentrated in authoritarian regimes in the Middle 
East, Russia, and China. SWFs located in authoritarian regimes are less likely to have 
adequate independence from government. Furthermore, SWFs like China’s that receive 
funding from excess foreign reserves have could grow enormously in size based solely on 
the decision of the national government.72 The growth potential of SWF assets increases 
the future impact that SWFs could have on the global economy. These areas of the world 
often experience political instability or policies that are unfriendly to Western interests.73 
Because the concentration of most SWF wealth is held in these authoritarian countries, 
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SWFs provide a greater threat to the US than if SWF wealth was concentrated in the 
stable democratic West.  
Because SWFs assets are large enough to move a country’s finances, balance of 
payments, and balance sheets, the form that SWFs take to fit within a domestic structure 
matters.74 As demonstrated in 2008, SWFs can provide liquidity and support domestic 
fiscal and monetary policy, if coordinated correctly.75 But the size of assets can also 
negatively affect macroeconomic policy if the SWF’s relationship with the host 
government is not properly managed.76 Consequently, when a SWF’s transparency is low 
its threat level increases.   
 
Transparency 
Lack of transparency among most SWFs provides an additional threat to the US 
economy.77 Any investment relies on trust between the two parties involved in the 
transaction. Trust is in part dependent on information and evidence.78 When transparency 
is low, it is harder for host countries to place trust in SWFs.79 SWFs with high 
transparency, like Norway’s fund, maintain a positive image among host countries that 
allow it access to more markets while still returning a profit.80 Limited transparency in 
other SWFs, consequently, is not essential to the commercial viability of SWFs. Host 
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countries can perceive any SWF with a lower degree of transparency than Norway as a 
security threat.  
A lack of transparency in the investment objectives of SWFs can introduce 
instability and volatility into the markets.81 It becomes difficult to predict when SWFs 
invest in companies and when they are likely to divest. Inability to track investment 
patterns of SWFs leaves companies at a disadvantage.82 SWFs can threaten to pull out of 
investments to leverage their position.83 Moreover, since little is known about SWF 
strategy, mere rumors of investment or divestment can cause market reactions.84  
Despite requirements for disclosure of policy objectives in international 
regulation of SWFs, most SWFs do not disclose their objectives.85 As mentioned before, 
most of the largest SWFs come from non-democratic, authoritarian regimes. Host 
countries have the perception that these countries tend to be less transparent and less 
accountable.86 Different countries’ governments constrain the investment activity of their 
SWFs differently depending on the fund’s degree of independence from the 
government.87 As these countries do not operate within capitalist principles, investment 
decisions are more vulnerable to geopolitical and political goals of the government.88 
Lack of disclosure by the government on policy objectives makes it difficult to determine 
if the investments are politically motivated.89 When political and geopolitical objectives 
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influence investment decisions, the risk is higher as investments are not made on 
commercial merits. Riskier investments increase the threat SWFs pose to the stability of 
the economy.  Lack of transparency can generate a greater perception of economic threat 
from host countries.  
While many experts on SWFs deny the risk that the funds pose to host countries 
and defend their ability to act as a stabilizing force in the global economy. But the lack of 
transparency makes politicians and the public reluctant to trust them.90 When SWFs do 
not release information on their strategies and behavior, assessments of how funds might 
react to portfolio losses are difficult.91 Lack of transparency continues to be an issue in 
assessing the real risk that SWFs pose to the US and the global economy.  
 
2.4 National Security Threat  
Geopolitical Use  
SWFs gave rise to anxiety over “state capitalism.” State capitalism here refers to 
“strategic acquisition in the pursuit of national objectives.”92 The issue of SWFs as a 
government-owned entity is that “…distinguishing the political state from its financial 
vehicles is artificial at best and not a true reflection of the realm in which the 21st century 
sovereign operates.”93 Governments are bodies with political and geopolitical goals. 
SWFs are tools sovereigns can use to achieve that goal. A SWF deployed to serve the 
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political goals of a foreign nation can be a national security threat for the host country of 
the investment.  
Most literature cites economic considerations as the cause for the creation of 
SWFs in countries. But political fads and fashions also play a role.94 Investigations 
completed by both the IMF and the World Bank are inconclusive about the success of 
SWFs in helping countries wealthy with natural resources manage the resource curse.95 
The resource curse refers to the phenomenon where “countries rich in natural resources, 
particularly minerals and fuels, perform less well economically than countries with fewer 
natural resources.” 96 Countries adopt SWFs to prevent the negative effects of the 
resource curse because of SWFs’ theorized ability to smooth shocks from volatile 
commodity prices. But because there is no assumed effectiveness of SWFs in preventing 
the negative effects of the resource curse there must be an alternate explanation for the 
rapid growth of SWFs. An explanation proposed is that countries attempt to emulate 
solutions, such as creating SWFs, used by others in order to signal their modernity or 
legitimacy in the global economy.97 The title of the “new power brokers of the global 
economy” given to SWFs by McKinsey & Company increases the geopolitical motive of 
countries, especially oil-producing countries, to establish SWFs for more international 
political clout.98 
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At the emergence of SWFs in the 1990s and early 2000s, SWFs almost 
exclusively existed in the Middle East. In the late 2000s, funds in Russia and China 
emerged posing a different threat to the US. Moreover, different states have different 
relationships with each other. The nationalism of the SWF evokes a different level of 
threat depending on whether the home country is an ally or an adversary to the host 
country.99 For example, investment in a US company by the Norwegian SWF will not 
provoke geopolitical concerns like an investment by the Chinese SWF would. 
Furthermore, according to international theory, democratic countries are less likely to 
engage in violent conflict with one another.100 SWFs with democratic governments are 
perceived to pose less of a threat to host countries. Because SWFs typically come from 
non-democratic states, it increases the perceived threat level of SWFs in aggregate.101 It 
is difficult for suspicions of geopolitical or political motives to be disproved when 
transparency is not adequate, as is typical for SWFs in non-democratic nations.102 
Political authorities face domestic pressure to use the vast wealth of the funds to 
promote the domestic economy and other domestic social objectives.103 Some SWFs were 
established only to be squandered due to short-term political pressures, as exemplified by 
Venezuela’s drain of its SWF, Fondo de Estabilización Macroeconómica (FEM), to fund 
social programs.104 One identified reason that some funds obtain lower return is 
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connected to the degree of independence that funds have from the home government.  
SWFs with a lower degree of independence tend to have lower returns due to the 
involvement of politicians.105  
SWFs also provide an opportunity for corruption. The fund can be used to make 
investments that benefit an individual rather than the entire country. White elephant 
projects in developing countries are also a corruption temptation evident through 
SWFs.106 Often the literature on state-owned enterprises attributes the inefficiency of 
state-owned enterprises to political motives of politicians. Shleifer and Vishny argue that 
“… public enterprises are highly inefficient, and their inefficiency is the result of political 
pressures from the politicians who control them.”107 While they were not referring 
directly to sovereign wealth funds, SWFs are publically owned and their argument is 
reaffirmed by SWF’s low-performance record.  
 The biggest national security threat emerges when SWF investment leads to 
active control of private firms by foreign governments.108 Anything beyond a passive 
investment, such as obtaining a controlling share of a company or seeking board seats, 
increases host country concerns over SWF investment.109 While SWFs do not often take 
controlling stakes in companies they invest in, evidence indicates SWFs partake in the 
shaping of corporate policy and target industries for political reasons.110 SWFs can 
                                               
105 Truman, 39.  
106 Truman, 38.  
107 Andrei Shleifer and Robert W Vishny, “The Politics of Market Socialism.” The Journal of Economic 
Perspectives 8, no.3 (1994): 165–76. 
108 Kimmitt.  
109 Kimmitt.  
110 Paul Calluzzo, G. N. Dong, and David Godsell, "Sovereign Wealth Fund Investments and the US 
Political Process," Journal of International Business Studies 48, no. 2 (2017): 222-243.  
30 
 
disrupt host country public policy through interventions in the market.111 By applying 
political pressure on the US through SWF investment, foreign governments can change 
the US political landscape. As mentioned before, the US Director of National Intelligence 
stated in 2008 Congressional Testimony that ‘‘Concerns about the financial capabilities 
of Russia, China, and OPEC countries and the potential use of their market access to 
exert financial leverage to achieve political ends represents a major national security 
issue.’’ Investment in companies lends SWFs and their home countries power at the 
expense of the host country.  
In the end, SWFs are government-controlled entities and governments have 
political objectives. 112 Former US Treasury Secretary Lawrence Summers summarized 
the threat when he stated, “The logic of the capitalist system depends on shareholders 
causing companies to act so as to maximize the value of their shares. It is far from 
obvious that this will over time be the only motivation of governments as 
shareholders.”113 SWFs are created to achieve both the financial and political goals of a 
country.114 Governments adopt SWFs to protect their economies from shocks that cause 
political consequences and to maintain political stability when resource revenues or 
foreign exchange reserves are no longer sufficient to fund the government. As a result, 
SWFs sit at the intersection of the financial and political objectives of a country.115 The 
goals that a fund pursues in its investments are wholly dependent on the home 
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government’s objectives. The great perceived threat of SWFs is that they are controlled 
by national entities with political and geopolitical goals, contrasting with private 
investors that typically only have commercial goals.116 For example, state-owned energy 
companies claim to follow purely commercial objectives, but there are instances where 
states use or threaten to use their control of the energy supply against political rivals.  
If SWFs are used to fulfill a political goal rather than a commercial goal, they can 
destabilize the host economy or be used by the home country as a geopolitical tool. But 
even if SWFs are used for strictly commercial reasons, they still represent a political 
purpose. If SWFs strengthen the economy of its home country, it increases the power of 
the state relative to others by increasing its position in the international system.117 In this 
form of non-military internal balancing, states employ their SWFs to increase their 
influence and power in other states without military interaction.118 SWFs could evolve 
into new arms of foreign policy for countries.119 Because SWFs are concentrated in 
undemocratic nations and some of the largest SWFs are owned by US rivals, 
strengthening of home countries through SWFs is a geopolitical threat to the US.  
Additionally, the fear of geopolitical actions by SWFs can provoke protectionist 
policies from Western countries. While there are more efficient and effective ways of 
conducting political or economic espionage than though SWF investment, once a country 
establishes a fund the risk it there.120 But some investments of SWFs indicate direct 
geopolitical motives more than others. For example, in 1995 Singapore’s SWF invested 
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in the Myanmar Fund in a political move to open channels to Burma.121 In 2010, SWFs in 
Saudi Arabia, Qatar, and Israel jointly invested in emerging markets signaling Saudi 
Arabia and Qatar’s willingness to cooperate with Israel.122  
 
Investment in Strategic Sectors  
The threat of SWF investment in strategic sectors derives from the opportunity of 
a nation to use their fund to acquire strategic corporate or public assets. Strategic sectors 
can be defined as the financial, energy, information technology, telecommunications, and 
transportation sectors of a national economy.123 Home countries can then use ownership 
of strategic companies as a geopolitical weapon against the home country as these sectors 
are essential to the national security of the host country.124 Christopher Cox, former 
Chairman of the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) stated in a speech before 
the SEC that SWFs can obtain an information advantage through inside information and 
have potential leverage and market distortion power from the information advantage.125 
Potential influence over governments lends legitimacy to national security concerns. 
SWFs have more resources available to gather information about a company, such 
as government intelligence or security services which gives SWFs an advantage over 
commercial investors.126 Theoretically, a government could use the information obtained 
by SWF investment in a company to increase the performance of a state-owned enterprise 
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in the same industry.127 SWFs externally strengthening power through strategic 
investments that lead to technology transfers means the US loses its competitive 
advantage in that industry.128 Investment in strategic sectors, like energy, secure 
resources necessary for national economic development.129 
Then-presidential candidate Barack Obama’s concern about SWFs stemmed from 
the influence that the funds could have on the boards of US financial institutions. He 
stated, “If they are buying big chunks of financial institutions and their board(s) of 
directors influence how credit flows in this country and they may be swayed by political 
considerations or foreign policy considerations, I think that is ... a concern.” Concerns 
about foreign investment in strategic sectors comes from the potential for states to 
degrade the investment, siphon resources, or steal sensitive technology.130 SWFs with a 
controlling share in a company leaves that company vulnerable to sabotage. The threat of 
sabotage risks the viability of a country’s productive capacity when these investments are 
large and in strategically important sectors. 131 The direct national security threat emerges 
from the defense sector as a strategic sector. Investment in the defense industry is one 
major indicator of geopolitical motives because it does not indicate domestic 
compensation or risk-return optimization.132 Non-financial motives behind investments in 
the defense sector could grant a home government access to sensitive military technology 
and intelligence.133  
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Another indicator of investment in strategic sectors to achieve geopolitical goals 
is an investment in those sectors during market downturns.134 Any investment in a not 
commercially-sound sector indicates a political or geopolitical motive in the investment. 
For example, investments by SWFs into US financial institutions during the 2008 
financial crisis represented a geopolitical motive because it highlighted the US’s 
vulnerability and appearance to depend on foreign funds.135 Most SWFs incurred a loss 
from these investments, calling into question the motives behind them.136 The financial 
sector of the US is extremely important to US national security as the US depends on its 
privileged global financial position to enforce its foreign policy.137  
 
2.7 Regulation of SWFs 
The severity of the threat that SWFs pose to the United States depends on the 
ability of international and domestic regulatory bodies to monitor SWF activity. National 
security threats of SWFs are typically handled by domestic regulators, while issues of 
economic stability, both domestically and internationally, are under the purview of the 
IMF and international regulation.138 
 
Domestic Regulations 
Federal regulations in the US are not specifically designed to address SWFs, but 
rather all foreign investment. Regulation of foreign investment in the US began with the 
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Trading with the Enemy Act in 1917 on the eve of the US’s entry into WWI.139 The act 
allowed the president to veto or oversee any trade between the US and its adversaries.140 
The Investment Company Act of 1940, enacted to promote confidence in the sector and 
protect the public’s interest, regulates mutual funds and closed-end funds.141 Both of 
these early regulations on trade with other foreign entities influenced and applies to 
regulation on SWFs.  
 In the US, SWFs are subject to the same regulatory requirements as private pools 
of capital.142 According to the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, SWFs must disclose 
purchases of equity stakes 5% or greater in publically traded companies.143 But SWFs are 
not subject to the more intense disclosure requirements of investment companies.144 A 
threshold for disclosure and less intense disclosure requirements than other financial 
institutions allow loopholes in US regulation of SWFs. It also lowers required SWF 
transparency, increasing threat salience.  
SWFs are primarily regulated by the Committee on Foreign Investment in the 
United States (CFIUS). The main purpose of CFIUS is to balance the principle of open 
investment in the US with the need to protect national security.145 The committee only 
concerns itself with investments that are related to national security. Except for two 
heavily publicized investigations, CFIUS reviews most investments within the 30-day 
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investigation window and without controversy.146  The committee, in its original 
mandate, does not investigate purchases of stakes less than 10%.147 CFIUS oversight 
effectiveness is limited because of the constraints allowing it to only consider national 
security threats of investments and lack of precedent for action. Market integrity issues 
and disclosures of SWFs are regulated by the US Securities and Exchange Commission 
(SEC).148 Due to the low degree of transparency, it is difficult for the SEC to enforce 
securities regulations.149 Both CFIUS and the SEC are limited in their ability to 
meaningfully monitor and enforce financial regulation.  
In 2007 Congress passed a new CFIUS law that increased scrutiny in transactions 
with ties to foreign governments.  The Foreign Investment and National Security Act 
(FINSA) allows the president to review and reject potential SWF investment in US 
companies that threaten national security. FINSA amended the Defense Production Act 
of 1950 and granted the power to the president to judge investments pending CFIUS 
review.150 CFIUS can enter negotiations with the parties involved or put restrictions on 
the transaction.151 But the caveat to the provision is the voluntary nature of SWF’s 
requirement to file a notice of transaction with CFIUS.152  Moreover, CFIUS can only 
recommend to the president to order divestment; the power is completely at the discretion 
of the president.153 After Congress passed FINSA, some members expressed concern that 
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the law allowed loopholes for some foreign investment bodies like SWFs.154 The 
deficiency of CFIUS to comprehensively review investment by SWFs was a by-product 
of grouping SWF investment with all other foreign investment.  
In August 2018, President Trump signed into law the Foreign Investment Risk 
Review Act of 2018 (FIRRMA).  FIRRMA launches pilot programs to enforce parts of 
the legislation that did not become effective directly after the law passed.155 CFIUS 
review of foreign investment expanded under the law to include minority investments in 
critical technologies, excluding passive investments. FIRRMA provides the US some 
protection from SWFs making targeted, minority investments in order to obtain access to 
US technology. But this law aimed to strengthen President Trump’s authority in 
reviewing foreign investments, not to expand the evaluation process of investments that 
could impact national security.156 Additionally, the new regulation fails to separate SWF 
investment or investment from public entities from private foreign investment, allowing 
SWFs the ability to continue avoiding informed review. 
Political contributions from foreign entities are banned in Article I of the US 
Constitution. Citizens United v. Federal Elections Committee (FEC) increased the ability 
of corporations to contribute to political action committees (Super PACs) by abolishing 
contribution limits. Indirectly, the ruling opened a loophole for foreign holders of a 
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corporation to participate in US politics. SWFs, as shareholders of US companies, allow 
foreign governments to contribute through US companies in an unlimited amount due to 
the loophole.157 For this reason, SWFs could target politically active firms in order to 
participate in the US political process and shape US public policy.158 The effectiveness of 
regulators like CFIUS and the SEC are undermined by this development as it is harder to 
combat all national security threats emerging from SWF investment.  
 
International Regulations  
The principal regulator of SWFs is the IMF through the Santiago Principles. 
Other international regulations of SWFs include market regulators’ activity 
harmonization by the International Organization of Securities Commission.159 SWFs are 
also subject to regulations defined in regional trade agreements (RTAs).  But RTA 
regulations are applied indirectly to SWFs. The Santiago Principles is the only 
international regulation that was created for and applied exclusively to SWFs.  
The IMF created the International Working Group (IWG) to legitimize sovereign 
wealth funds as responsible institutional investors as well as influential actors in the 
international currency markets.160 The IMF believed that an open dialogue between home 
and host countries could mitigate policy concerns.161 Representatives from the various 
funds came together to establish an agreement of best practices to regulate themselves.162  
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The IWG presented the agreement for 24 Generally Accepted Principles and 
Practices, called the Santiago Principles, to the IMF in October 2008.163  No other 
framework for the regulation or oversight of SWFs existed before the principles.164 Some 
of the guidelines of the Santiago Principles are based loosely on the OECD Guidelines on 
Corporate Governance of State-Owned Enterprises. These guidelines promoted the 
operative independence of state-owned enterprises from the government.165 After the 
Santiago Principles were created, the IWG transformed into the International Forum of 
Sovereign Wealth Funds (IFSWF). The IFSWF helps members implement the Santiago 
Principles and enhance the investment capabilities of SWFs.166 As a voluntary 
organization, not all SWFs are members of the IFSWF and SWFs are not required to 
comply with the Santiago Principles as a requirement for membership.  
The Santiago Principles are split into three areas. First, they address the SWF 
legal framework, objectives, and coordination with macroeconomic policies.167 The first 
and second principles set the guideline that policy goals of SWFs should be clearly 
defined to prevent political interference.168 The next three principles outline the processes 
to increase macroeconomic coordination with host governments. Transparency is the 
mechanism that achieves the coordination of macroeconomic policy in the agreement. 
The next section pertains to the institutional framework and governance structure 
of SWFs and establishes guidelines for good corporate governance.169  But disclosure of 
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financial information of SWFs is only provided to the regulator and the host country and 
is not available to the public.170 Some financial information like audited financial 
statements, the size of assets, use of derivatives, and leverage is not required to be 
disclosed.171 There is also not a requirement to publically publish annual reports 
conducted by the fund. Additionally, while the independence of funds from the 
government is promoted by the principles, loopholes exist in legal differences regarding 
the government’s relationship to the fund.172 
Lastly, the investment and risk-management frameworks are established in the 
principles. Principle 18 asserts that SWFs should establish and publish investment 
objectives and risk tolerance.173 The necessity of SWFs to be governed by economic and 
financial objectives is addressed in Principle 19. Including this principle is meant to quell 
host country fears of the political and geopolitical motives of SWFs. Disclosure of voting 
and ownership rights of SWFs is also recommended in this section. Lastly, the 
enforcement mechanisms of the principles are described as self-assessment and third-
party verification.174 However, third-party verification is rarely implemented because the 
IMF has a limited role in the enforcement of the Santiago Principles.  
The IFSWF accomplished a relative increase in transparency among funds. But 
the body is constrained to the extent that it can enforce transparency agreements.175 Many 
SWFs do not adhere to all of the transparency guidelines.176 Voluntary organizations, like 
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the IFSWF, cannot force funds to comply with the Santiago Principles. The Santiago 
Principles are “enforced” by the IFSWF, which is made up of SWF countries. Global law 
is referred to as informal soft law because enforcement is difficult due to the absence of a 
global government. The Santiago Principles suffers from being global law without a state 
to enforce it. This puts SWFs in the position of both player and referee.177 Consequently, 
the Santiago Principles have a higher level of compliance among funds coming from 
liberal democracies.178 Countries with more power in the international system are also 
more equipped to regulate SWFs when only international soft law exists. While the US 
has the ability to sufficiently monitor and regulate SWF investments, not all countries, 
especially developing countries, have such an ability.179 The Santiago Principles’ 
weakness lies in the “should” nature of the principles rather than “must”.180 As a result, 
SWFs vary in their compliance with international regulatory guidelines. 
 
2.6 Probability of the Realization of Threats 
Game Theory 
In game theory, the behavior is dependent on what one actor thinks another actor 
will do.181 Because of this phenomenon, actors act strategically. Game theory suggests 
the self-interested motivations of an actor results in less efficient outcomes than if they 
acted contrary to their rational self-interests through cooperation. 182 When actors make 
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deals that achieve the most efficient outcome, it is wholly dependent on trust if there is no 
regulatory mechanism.183 Game theory, in the case of SWFs, is based on the voluntary 
nature of the Santiago Principles as the regulatory mechanism. The application of game 
theory to SWFs finds that the host country depends on the goodwill of the SWF.184 Game 
theory analysis of SWFs concludes that host-countries relying on international ‘soft’ 
regulation, like the Santiago Principles, is “strategically unwise.”185 The nature of SWF 
regulation causes the realization of national and economic security threats more likely. 
 
Propensity of Shareholder Activism  
A study conducted by Ghahramani examined the propensity of SWFs to engage in 
shareholder activism and how activism affects corporate governance. It found that SWFs 
engaged in more activism when their portfolios consisted of a higher concentration of 
equities and when they had a lower degree of independence from government.186 Use of 
external managers lowered propensity for SWFs to engage in shareholder activism.187 
The probability that SWFs will try to influence the management of a company is 
dependent on each individual SWFs portfolio and governance structure.188 Consequently, 
each SWF must be examined individually in order to assess the threat of SWFs 
influencing a company through purchases of stock with special attention given to the 
SWF’s degree of independence from government.  
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Unfounded Concerns 
After the large role that SWFs played in providing much-needed liquidity to 
Western financial institutions during the 2008 crisis, a multitude of literature on SWFs 
found their threat to be at best, minor. 189 SWF investments in aggregate were not found 
to cause market volatility or distortions.190 The literature on SWFs after the crisis 
concluded that they were innocent contributors to the global economic system. Most 
scholars concluded that SWFs only had the potential to be an economic or national 
security threat to the US but did not act in a threatening manner.  
The danger of reducing the threat of SWFs because of the lack of realization of 
the threats and ignoring their potential is that even if they do not act politically or 
destabilizing today does not mean that they cannot act in such a way tomorrow.191 
Dangers of SWFs cannot be ruled out regardless of their actions in the past or present. 
Future distortions of economic markets or national security threats remain regardless. 
Furthermore, the capacity of SWFs to have an impact is increasing as funds accumulate 
more assets and more countries adopt funds.192 The landscape of intentional relations is 
also changing as incentives for war are decreasing and countries are competing more on 
economic issues.193 SWFs could play a large role in interstate competition as they 
increase economic interaction between states and represent a great deal of economic 
power. The lack of threatening action in the past does not guarantee safety in the future as 
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SWFs continue to increase their power.  Consequently, the 2008 consensus that SWFs are 
not geopolitically motivated actors does not necessarily hold true in 2019.  
 
2.7 Conclusion  
The threat that SWFs pose to the US is unique. Governance and portfolio 
structure of SWFs are diverse enough to produce a different threat to every host 
country.194 SWFs, then, pose a different threat to the US than they do the European 
Union. And the Norwegian SWF poses a different level of threat to the US than the 
Russian SWF does.  While international regulation can provide guidelines for the 
oversight of SWFs, it is important that the US also maintains domestic regulation that can 
address the US’s relationship with each specific home country.  
One of the major dangers of SWFs is that their assumed threats could lead to a 
rise in financial protectionism in host countries.195 The threat of SWFs can initiate a new 
wave of protectionist policies that the current international system is already leaning 
towards. Financial protectionism in the US through excessive regulation of SWFs could 
diminish opportunities for capital inflows. But, inadequate international regulation of 
SWFs leaves host countries vulnerable to geopolitically motivated investments and their 
detrimental effects on national and economic security. Domestic regulation regarding the 
national security threat offers the US a thin layer of protection, but holes still exist in 
regulation that can be exploited. CFIUS and other regulators are almost powerless unless 
the president believes an investment to be against US interests. But international 
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regulation and protection against economic threats are even more insufficient. Soft 
regulatory approaches lack enforcement mechanisms to punish SWFs if they do not 
adhere to the Santiago Principles. Transparency requirements in both domestic and 
international regulation are weak. The weak regulation of SWFs makes potential threats 
more concerning and probable.  
The inflow of capital into a country by a SWF followed by a rapid exit of capital 
could contribute to market volatility.196 The US is particularly vulnerable to 
consequences from shifts in capital by SWFs.197 During the 2008 financial crisis, the flow 
of capital to US treasuries greatly increased demand for US-dollar assets.198 But losses 
incurred on credit and equity instruments, as well as increasing government debt, could 
lead to an increased risk premium on US assets.199 The increased riskiness of US assets 
could cause an economically destabilizing mass exit of capital from SWFs investment in 
the US as many countries begin to diversify their foreign exchange reserves. While SWFs 
do not currently have enough economic weight in the global financial system to cause a 
dollar crash in the US, they are on a path to acquire even more assets and can also trigger 
herd behavior in other financial institutions. 
SWFs have a clear potential to alter the behavior of other states.200 There are 
several avenues that home countries can take to utilize their SWF as a tool to achieve 
their geopolitical goals. The most direct way is through leveraging their investment in US 
companies to gain influence in the US. Investment in another country can bolster the 
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home country’s soft power strength. Cooperation and partnerships with other SWFs can 
also enhance the home country’s international influence and award the home country a 
soft power advantage over the US.  
But what is not clear is the specific mechanism through which SWFs could alter 
other state’s decisions.201 A lack of transparency is partly responsible for the opaqueness 
of this ability. The majority of constraints on SWFs acting geopolitically are domestic 
such as competing bureaucratic interests, profit requirements, and the goals of individual 
leaders. National security threats of SWFs are, for the most part, potential threats. While 
game theory dictates that it would be unwise to ignore these threats, it is not proper to 
categorize all SWFs as threats to national or economic security.  Rather, each SWF must 
be examined and its home country’s relationship with the US must be considered in order 
to make that determination.  
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Chapter 3: Case Study 1 – The Russian Sovereign Wealth Funds 
3.1: Introduction 
Russia’s SWFs pose a national security threat to the United States. Russia has 
geopolitical motives in its management of SWFs that stem from its difficult relationship 
with the United States. This chapter provides an assessment of the risks that the Russian 
SWFs pose to the US. Examining how these funds are structured and their past actions 
will provide the justification for amending how the US might regulate SWFs more 
effectively.  
Most of the assessments regarding the threat that SWFs pose to the US’s national 
and economic security occurred in 2008 when the Santiago Principles were negotiated. 
The Russian established a stabilization fund in 2004, but the Russia SWF that is able to 
make significant foreign direct investments and is most active in global politics was not 
established until 2007. Consequently, the Russian SWFs were rarely included in these 
assessments.  Furthermore, at the time of the assessments, most of the SWF related 
threats to US national security arose from the Middle East and threat assessments focused 
on the Middle Eastern SWFs. Following Russia’s 2014 annexation of Crimea and 
meddling in the 2016 US election, the threat perception shifted to Russia. In response to 
both of these actions, the US placed sanctions on Russia and restricted the Russian 
SWFs’ access to US markets. While there are sanctions and domestic constraints on the 
Russian SWFs, low transparency and the absence of independence from government 
increases the use of the SWFs to achieve geopolitical goals that are against US interests.  
  In order to assess the degree of risk and ways to mitigate it, this chapter will first 
describe the structure of Russia’s SWFs, examining their establishment, underlying 
48 
 
ideology, goals, degree of independence from government, and the domestic politics 
affecting the SWFs. Secondly, this chapter will discuss the funds’ transparency, 
accountability, and compliance with the Santiago Principles. Then it will analyze the 
geopolitical actions of the SWFs by reviewing the effects of the sanctions and the SWFs’ 
international partnerships. Next, the roles of unitary actors in Russia will be considered. 
Finally, the Russian SWF investment in a US company, Hyperloop, will be examined in 
order to illustrate the insufficiency of current SWF regulations in preventing investment 
in a strategic sector.  
 
3.2: Structure of the Funds  
Establishment  
Russia adopted a stabilization fund in 2004 in an effort to balance the federal 
budget. Budget problems arose from volatile oil prices and inflation became a concern. 
The Russian Stabilization Fund (RSF) could be used to cover federal deficits when oil 
prices decreased below a baseline, but when prices rose above, the fund could be used for 
other purposes.202 The International Monetary Fund (IMF) played an important role in the 
establishment of the RSF. Russia was heavily encouraged by the IMF to establish a 
stabilization fund after the Russian debt default of 1998. It recommended a stabilization 
fund because of the theorized effectiveness of stabilization funds in helping countries 
manage the symptoms of the resource curse. The IMF was not the only international 
institution who urged Russia to establish a fund. After the 1998 debt crisis in Russia, 
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many international financial institutions (IFIs), such as the World Bank, recommended 
the establishment of a stabilization fund.203  Russia ultimately used the funds amassed in 
the RSF to pay back its foreign debts. 
In 2008, the RSF was split into two different SWFs, the National Welfare Fund 
(NWF) and the Reserve Fund (RF).204  The main purpose of the NWF is to act as a 
classical SWF, which aims to diversify investments domestically and internationally in 
order to support pension savings and increase investment performance. The RF is 
intended as a fund to balance the budget. In 2011, the Russian Direct Investment Fund 
(RDIF) was established. Endorsed by President Putin, the RDIF was created primarily to 
support Russian companies by making equity investments.205 Only 20% of its funds can 
be deployed outside of Russia, but the RDIF must secure a co-investment in order to 
directly invest in Russia. A CEO leads the fund and equity professionals manage the 
fund. One of the main differences of the RDIF, as compared to the NWF or RF, is that it 
is a subsidiary of Vnesheconombank (VEB), which is a government-owned development 
bank. Another difference is that the majority of RDIF investments are made in domestic 
projects. Russian SWFs are subject to extensive qualifications for potential investments 
including strict a credit rating threshold and distribution requirements. Restrictions placed 
on the investment directorate of the funds create difficulties in pursuing non-profitable 
investments. 
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Underlying Ideology  
Russia’s adoption of a stabilization fund was not precipitated by a change in ideas 
in Russia, but rather due to a case of normative and coercive institutional mimicking. The 
majority of Russian economists are skeptical of monetarist and neoliberal economic 
policies of which SWFs are a combination of. But volatile oil prices and inflation had led 
to a weaker Russian economy. SWFs in countries like Kuwait and Norway were designed 
to help protect their economies from the symptoms of the resource curse like high 
inflation and resource windfalls.206 Coupled with pressure from the IMF, Russia adopted 
a stabilization fund.  
Dabrowska and Zweynert identify the problem with the establishment of SWFs in 
Russia; it did not represent an establishment of monetarist and neoliberal principles in the 
Russian economy.207 The original intent of the RSF, and SWFs in general, is to cultivate 
macroeconomic stability by controlling inflation and preventing the volatile nature of oil 
prices from affecting the economy by accruing the surplus money and storing it in a 
reserve.208 But factions within Russian politics perceived it as an opportunity to return to 
the practice of transferring resource revenues to other sectors of the economy, acting as a 
mechanism for redistribution.209 The Soviet Union had policies of using resource rents 
from oil and gas production to diversify the economy in the 1960s.210 By adjusting the 
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mandate of typical stabilization funds, the Russian government used the RSF and 
subsequent SWFs to return the Russian economy to Soviet principles.211 Russia took the 
idea of the institution and transformed it to achieve different outcomes without adopting 
the ideas that SWFs were created upon. For example, IMF proposals for a Russian 
stabilization fund omitted the use of such a fund for domestic investments, but the RSF 
implemented invested predominantly in Russia. The consequence of the failure to adopt 
these ideas is that Russia can morph the institution to achieve whatever objectives the 
government deems necessary, regardless of whether it fits within the norm or explicit 
purpose of the institution.  
 
Goals  
When Russia established the RSF in 2004, there was no clear legal structure as to 
how the funds were to be spent. Assets above RUB 500 billion could be used for ‘other’ 
purposes, and there was no clear definition as to what those other purposes were.212 The 
general asset allocation of the NWF and RF when the RSF split in 2008 was in the 
purchase of foreign securities, deposits in banks, corporate debt securities, corporate 
equities, and investment fund shares.213 The Russian Finance Ministry also restricted the 
countries from which the funds could purchase debt securities to Austria, Belgium, 
Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Spain, 
Sweden, the United Kingdom, and the US because of their high credit ratings.214 
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However, the main function of the funds is to support Russian pensions. During the 2008 
global financial crisis, the NWF transferred US $17 billion of assets to VEB to lend to 
domestic banks and businesses.215 The goals of the RDIF are different than the other 
funds because they aim to bring investments to Russia through foreign investments and 
talent and technology acquisition.216 
 In general, it is difficult to assess the non-financial goals of the NWF and the RF 
because of their limited transparency.217 But even though their non-financial goals are not 
disclosed, some can be gleaned by analyzing actions of the fund and the context of those 
actions. For example, recently the NWF and RF have been observed pursuing non-
financial goals. They aided the Russian economy by providing funds to the government 
after the economy was strained by international sanctions.218 These sanctions were put 
into place in 2013 as a result of Russia’s annexation of Crimea. Then in 2014, the 
downward trend in oil prices also put the Russian economy in a weak position. Both of 
these factors necessitated the use of Russia’s SWFs to advance the domestic political 
goals of the Russian government.  
The Russian SWFs prove to be an important political tool in encouraging 
domestic support for the Putin regime. Despite heavy US sanctions, the Russian 
government was able to cushion the economy by funding government deficits through the 
RF.219 The military and infrastructure sectors of the government used the SWFs to 
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finance the increase in their spending. These actions have were against the advice of 
finance and economic development ministers.220 By utilizing the RF to ease the effects of 
the economic downturn, the Putin Administration maintained high public support for the 
military intervention in Ukraine. By January of 2018, the Russian government depleted 
the RF because of its excessive use to fund budget deficits. Even though the RF was 
implemented to fund government deficits during times of economic downturns or energy 
price drops, it also served a political purpose. Public support for any leader of a country is 
strongly related to the state of the economy. By blunting the effects of the economic 
downturn, the RF provided a political service for the Putin Administration.  
 
Degree of Independence 
According to the IFSWF in the Santiago Principles self-assessment of the RDIF, 
the fund does have a sufficient degree of independence from the government. The RDIF 
claims to be compliant with Principle 9, which states that: “The operational management 
of the SWF should implement the SWF’s strategies in an independent manner and in 
accordance with clearly defined responsibilities.”221 It is commonplace for SWFs to be 
accountable to a government body such as the Minister of Finance, an elected official, or 
the Parliament.222 The Russian SWFs are not subject to oversight from the Russian 
Parliament. Officially, the RDIF has full independence as long as it operates within the 
rules that the government mandated in the establishment of the SWF. In practice, though, 
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the fund does run with significant input from the government. The CEO of the RDIF and 
President Putin have regular meetings to discuss the fund’s investments and the strategy 
of the fund. Only some of these meetings are on the record. Moreover, President Putin 
created the fund and the objectives of the fund and, as a result, he has some degree of 
control over the actions of the RDIF. Chris Weafer, a senior partner at the Moscow-based 
investment advisory firm Macro Advisory, described the RDIF as a political body, noting 
its strong ties with the Kremlin.223 The government will often set an economic goal, and 
the RDIF will seek partnerships and investments that will help achieve that goal.224 
Both the NWF and RF are assets that contribute to revenues available to fund the 
federal budget. In the establishment of the SWFs, the government set broad limits to limit 
the allocation of the funds. It has allowed the government to take control of the SWFs 
when needed. The legislative bodies in Russia do not have control over the direction of 
the funds’ investments.225 However, the Central Bank of the Russian Federation and the 
Ministry of Finance are involved in the management of the funds. The Ministry of 
Finance maintains full management control over the NWF and the RF. Neither of these 
SWFs can operate independently because an agency of the government is in control.226 
Russian SWFs do not operate in a way that is independent of the government. Separation 
from the government is necessary for SWFs to be perceived as investment bodies that are 
primarily concerned with maximizing returns, rather than state-owned enterprises that act 
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in the economic or political interest of home countries. Without independence of 
government, host countries perceive SWFs as serving a geopolitical purpose.  
 
Domestic Politics  
The NWF has been the subject of an internal power struggle in Russia with many 
domestic groups fighting to use the SWFs for their own purposes.227 The Ministry of 
Finance is on one side and President Putin’s cabinet is on the other, in terms of how the 
funds should be used.228As a result, the SWFs do not have a clear outline or agenda. 
Russia’s SWFs have been subject to domestic disputes, which constrain their ability to 
invest abroad. The SWFs are commonly used domestically for political purposes. The 
division of the RSF into the NWF and the RF was caused by the two competing factions 
in Russia. The Putin Administration wanted to use the RSF to pay for domestic projects 
while the Ministry Department wanted to keep it as strictly a sterilization mechanism.229 
A sterilization mechanism takes excess money out of the economy to prevent inflation.230 
When the amount of sterilized money equals the excess resource rent revenues, then the 
macroeconomic indicators of the country remain stable because the mechanism smooths 
external shocks.231 The split allowed the government to pursue domestic industrial policy 
using the RF while the NWF could continue the sterilization function. However, in 2013, 
the majority of the NWF was used domestically.232 
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Prior to the establishment of SWFs, Russian state-owned enterprises were 
described as inefficient because of their political use and use to influence decisions 
regarding the domestic budget.233 The recent management of the SWFs reinforced the 
Russian government’s inability to separate political goals and economic institutions. 
Russia financed its deficits over the years by using RF assets. It allowed the Putin 
Administration to maintain popularity; by financing deficits using the RF, the 
government has avoided increasing taxes or increasing the national debt. Both of these 
alternatives would have caused adverse effects on the Putin Administration’s popularity. 
Moreover, some assets from the NWF were redistributed through VEB in the form of 
domestic loans.234  
 The domestic competition for the use of the SWFs demonstrates the barriers in 
using them to make foreign investments. Public pressure on the Putin Administration to 
use the SWFs to temper fiscal shortfalls also restricts their use. If it is difficult to make 
foreign investments, then Russia has less opportunity to use the SWFs for geopolitical 
purposes. But the low transparency of these funds leaves the public or other government 
officials blind as to where these funds are headed and constraining pressure cannot be put 
on the government to use the SWFs domestically.  
 
3.3: Transparency & Compliance with Rules  
Linaburg-Maduell Transparency Index 
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The Linaburg-Maduell Transparency Index is a measure of SWF transparency 
developed by the Sovereign Wealth Fund Institute in 2008. SWFs are evaluated on ten 
principles, and the fulfillment of a principle adds one point to their score. The Sovereign 
Wealth Fund Institute recommends a minimum score of 8 out of 10 for adequate 
transparency. According to the Linaburg-Maduell Transparency Index, the NWF and the 
RF score 5 out of 10 points for transparency.235 Both funds officially agree to comply 
with the Santiago Principles, including the principles on transparency, although in 
practice they do not completely adhere to them. The RDIF has a transparency rating of 7 
out of 10 according to the Linaburg-Maduell Transparency Index. In the 2008 release of 
the index, Russia ranked 40th out of 56 of all SWFs ranked.236 It is on the low end of 
transparency ratings and, therefore, the Russian SWFs are not relatively transparent. For 
reference, the graph below compares the ranking of the RDIF’s transparency score on the 
Linaburg-Maduell Transparency Index with other prominent SWFs:  
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Data Source: The Sovereign Wealth Fund Institute 
 
Truman Scoreboard  
According to the Truman Scoreboard, which is a more comprehensive way to 
measure transparency and accountability of SWFs, the NWF and the RF scored 53 out of 
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100 in 2012.237 While this was a 15 percentage point increase since 2007, it was below 
the mean of all SWFs which is 54. 238 Russia had recently established the RDIF and the 
scoreboard could not rank the fund yet. In 2016, the NWF and the RF scored a 49.239 The 
RDIF scored a 36. The NWF and RF’s score decreased by 5 points from 2012 to 2016.  
Between 2012 and 2016 SWFs, in general, became more accountable and transparent as 
the average score increased to 62. Russia’s SWFs were a deviation from the trend. The 
RDIF scored very low on the scoreboard. It had the 7th lowest score out of all 60 SWFs 
ranked. Russia is one of the largest holders of SWFs assets, which causes their low rate of 
accountability, transparency, and diversion from the trend concerning and increases the 
threat level of the Russian SWFs.  
 
Overall Transparency and Accountability  
 To put these numbers into context, Russia ranks 138th out of 176 countries on the 
Corruption Perceptions Index in 2018 with a score of 28 out of 100. The corruption index 
ranks countries from least corrupt to most corrupt.  Oman, which scores a 52 on the 
Truman Scoreboard, ranks 53th on the Corruptions Perceptions Index.240 Iran, which 
scores a 48 on the Truman Scoreboard, is tied with Russia on the corruption perception 
index. As shown, the transparency rate of the fund has little correlation with the overall 
corruption level of the nation. For a nation that ranks far down in the corruption rankings, 
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it is discordant that Russia has an around average SWF transparency rating. However, the 
level of corruption in a country is relevant to the SWF’s ability to make investments 
based on their potential returns. Russia has been labeled as an ineffective operator of 
state-owned enterprises due to its failure to maximize the use of their assets.241 As a SWF 
is essentially a state-owned enterprise and because of the low degree of independence, 
corruption in the Russian government has the potential to influence the legitimate 
conduct of the Russian SWFs and decrease their profits. 
The limited transparency of the Russian SWFs has concerned the IMF since the 
RSF’s establishment in 2004.242 Russia’s SWFs have around US $120 billion in assets 
under management, making its three SWFs combined one of the largest SWFs in the 
world.243 It is considered good practice to keep SWF interests, operations, and investment 
strategies somewhat secret as they could potentially have significant effects on the 
market.244 However, in comparison other countries with the same amount of assets, or 
even more, they can have higher transparency ratings without adverse effects on their 
returns. For example, Norway has a Truman Scoreboard ranking of 98 and also has US 
$990 billion in assets, making it the largest SWF.245  
Russia’s SWFs lack of a third-party audit system limits the ability to assess the 
political motives of the fund both domestically and internationally.246 The management 
mechanisms of the funds are not open to external oversight.247 The NWF has no official 
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information on the composition of its assets.248 There is also no disclosure of the 
performance of the investments to the public.249 The RF also has limited transparency. 
However, in January 2018 the RF depleted its assets and was reintegrated into the NWF 
which made the composition of its assets known.  The RDIF also does not disclose the 
assets that are under its management. The Russian SWFs’ lack of transparency creates 
difficulty in assessing whether investments are geopolitically motivated and increase their 
degree of risk.  
 
Santiago Principles Compliance 
All of the Russian SWFs operate in an overall non-transparent way according to 
the IFSWF, despite being part of the creation of the Santiago Principles.250 The RDIF has 
extremely low compliance with the Santiago Principles, as demonstrated by its low score 
on the Truman Scoreboard. As Russia one of the largest SWFs and a country with 
traditionally geopolitical motives, this has an impact on how much and what type of 
regulation that the US pursues on SWFs.  
The IFSWF is an institution that serves as a watchdog of SWF compliance with 
the Santiago Principles. The NWF and the RF are not members of the IFSWF; the RDIF 
became a member in 2012. The RDIF only scores 36% in terms of compliance with all 33 
of the Santiago Principles in 2015.251 The NWF and RF scored 49% compliance with the 
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Santiago Principles.252 The infancy of the RDIF also plays a role in general compliance 
with the Santiago Principles. Newer funds seem to follow a trend of non-compliance and 
then generally become more compliant as the funds age.253 
The IFSWF reports that the RDIF does not completely comply with the Santiago 
Principles.  The IMF has lost its leverage over Russia. When the RSF was established in 
2004, Russia was able to pay back debt it owed to the IMF in 2005. 254 As a result, the 
IMF has fewer incentives to compel Russia’s SWFs to comply with the Santiago 
Principles.  Russia submitted a principle by principle self-assessment of its compliance 
with the Santiago Principles to the IFSWF. It is hard to confirm the information Russia 
has provided in their self-assessment given the limited transparency of their SWFs. 
Additionally, the inherent bias in its self-assessment makes it difficult to determine 
whether Russia complies with the Santiago Principles to the extent that it claims.  
The conclusion of all of these assessments of the Russian SWFs is that even 
though SWF governing bodies agree that Russia SWFs have low transparency, 
accountability, and compliance, the IMF does not have an enforcement mechanism to 
encourage Russia to remedy these shortfalls. The IMF acknowledges that Russia does not 
fully comply with the Santiago Principles, but cannot act to remedy Russia’s failure to 
comply. The RDIF is a member of the IFSWF, yet the IFSWF grades it at only 33% 
compliance with the Santiago Principles. The IFSWF also has no mechanisms to enforce 
the Santiago Principles on its member funds. Russian SWFs are becoming less 
transparent and less accountable because they are self-regulated. The absence of any of 
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the current SWF governing bodies to address the failings of the Russian funds is 
concerning for nations in which these SWFs invest in.  
 
3.4: Geopolitical Actions  
Effect of Sanctions 
The sanctions imposed on Russia due to the annexation of the Crimea negatively 
impacted the Russian economy. In 2014, President Obama identified the RDIF as a major 
source of Russian capital; hence, sanctioning it would have a major effect on the Russian 
economy. 255 The RDIF represents a major source of power for Russia and a 
geopolitically important institution. Yet Russia’s depletion of the RF demonstrates that 
Russia is willing to endure economic hardship in order to achieve its geopolitical goals.256  
The Russian government used the RF to finance the large fiscal gap resulting 
from the sanctions. The depletion of the RF has not created pressure on the Russian 
government to stop military actions in order for the sanctions to be repealed. Instead, the 
government has called for it to be allowed to take on more debt, or to decrease spending 
everywhere except defense. Use of the SWFs to fund government deficits caused a 
decrease in the impact of US sanctions, making them a less useful tool in US foreign 
policy towards Russia. The sanctions’ high level of detrimental effects on the Russia 
SWFs demonstrates that Russia is not opposed to degrading the value of their SWFs in 
order to achieve their geopolitical goals. The Russian government uses SWF assets in 
order to achieve a geopolitical goal, but it causes negative returns.  
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Additionally, the US sanctioned VEB, which is the bank that backs the RDIF. 
These sanctions make any investment in the US by the RDIF illegal according to the US 
Treasury Department. VEB’s status as the bank that backs the RDIF calls into question 
the neutrality of RDIF investments. The bank is a source of Russian soft power around 
the world, lending money to areas strategically important to Russia like Ukraine. Some of 
the largest US banks also have ties to VEB.  It has also been connected to Russian 
intelligence and as a government-owned bank, has connections to Putin.257 The sanctions 
against VEB have spurred concerns about the RDIF and its motives. In 2016, the RDIF 
attempted to separate itself from the VEB in order to evade sanctions. President Putin 
signed legislation that moved the management of the RDIF to the Russian Federal 
Agency for State Property Management.258 However, this was mostly a surface-level 
separation as most of the RDIF’s assets remained under VEB’s control.259 The RDIF has 
been subject to political maneuvering in order to circumvent US sanctions.  
 
International Partnerships 
The RDIF pursues strategic SWF partnerships throughout the world in critical 
sectors. Forming international partnerships in order to attract investment in Russia is the 
main goal of the RDIF.  Some of the locations in which Russia has pursued joint 
investment funds or platforms represent strategic advantages.260  It made a multi-billion 
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investment pledge with Gulf Coast Cooperation (GCC) sovereign wealth funds that 
include their energy sectors.261 Part of Russia’s strategy in these investments is to 
compete with and crowd-out Western energy companies.262 Through these investments, 
Russia expands its sphere of influence in the Middle East. It is a geopolitical strategy 
against the economic and security interests of the United States.  
The UAE, Saudi Arabia, and other GCC SWFs made a US $20 billion pledge to 
fund infrastructure, energy, transportation, and military production in Russia through the 
RDIF.263 The deal aimed to strengthen their relations with Russia.264 The deal is part of 
increasing cooperation between Russia and OPEC countries, especially Saudi Arabia and 
the UAE.265 The RDIF and its CEO play an important role in the development of those 
relationships. An increase in cooperation between Russia and the Gulf States problem for 
the US. Russia’s pivot to the Middle East challenges the US sphere of influence in the 
Middle East.266 Gulf States’ SWF investments in Russia give the Kremlin the advantage 
over the US. Furthermore, the role that the RDIF CEO Dmitriev played in negotiating 
agreements with these Gulf SWFs and political leaders indicates an increasing diplomatic 
role of the RDIF.  
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Russia’s alliances are with other SWFs in China, UAE, and Turkey. The Russia-
Turkey joint investment fund was launched in April of 2018. Economic ties between 
Turkey and Russia are concerning to the US due to the risk that they pose to the North 
Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). In March 2018, the US defense agency released a 
worldwide threat assessment that deemed Russia’s government relations with Turkey and 
its military sales to Turkey to “illustrate Russia’s strategic objective to strengthen its 
ability to project power into the Mediterranean and along NATO’s southern flank, 
expand its influence in the region, and exacerbate existing friction in NATO.”267 The 
timing of the partnership provides evidence that the RDIF is complementing Russia’s 
foreign policy with its own investments. Russia including the use of the RDIF in its 
challenge to NATO demonstrates that Russia deploys its SWF in order to achieve the 
geopolitical goals of the state.  
Other partnerships of the RDIF are with Kuwait, Japan, India, France, Bahrain, 
Italy, Saudi Arabia, Qatar, Brazil, Vietnam, and Armenia.  The US does not have any 
mechanisms in which to regulate these partnerships and, additionally, the partnerships are 
not in violation of the Santiago Principles. However, these partnerships limit the US’s 
ability to regulate Russian SWFs because they cannot sanction other countries’ as well. In 
general, the broad scope of Russian economic influence throughout the world indirectly 
poses a threat to the US as they are competing for influence as well. 
 
3.5: Role of Unitary Actors  
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The actions of three Russian actors have heightened suspicions that the SWFs 
have been or will be used for geopolitical purposes. The actions of the Russian SWFs and 
the motives behind those actions depend primarily on two individuals: Kirill Dmitriev, 
the CEO of the RDIF, and Vladimir Putin, Russia’s President. The departure of Alexei 
Kudrin from the Ministry Department also has consequences for the strategy of the 
Russian SWFs.  
 
Kirill Dmitriev 
As CEO of the RDIF, Kirill Dmitriev plays a large role in determining the fund’s 
investment strategy. Some of his actions, philosophies, and the motives behind his 
investment strategies are geopolitical. Dmitriev has strong academic ties to the US. He 
received his undergraduate degree from Stanford University and his MBA from Harvard 
Business School.268 He also worked for US financial services companies Goldman Sachs 
and McKinsey & Company. Whether it is because of his academic and professional ties 
to the US or Russia’s position as a global power, Dmitriev has been connected to the US 
in a couple of different ways.  He often advocates for the use of economics to create 
political ties between countries.  Dmitriev, when speaking to Western media outlets has 
outlined his philosophy that economic ties build strong political ties. He believes that the 
RDIF can be used to better facilitate cooperation between the US and Russia. In an 
interview with the American news outlet, CNBC, on May 23, 2018, Dmitriev stated: "We 
believe we are doing good for our countries, because we are building economic and 
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investment bridges that make our countries have good discussions and understand each 
other much better."269 He insinuates that economic investment forces countries to work 
together and have an open dialogue. The RDIF’s multitude of investment agreements 
with nations all over the world and Dmitriev’s interest in the US points to a diplomatic 
role for the RDIF. Russia’s desire to invest in the US in order to strengthen political ties 
through economic agreements demonstrates how SWFs are used to influence US foreign 
policy.   
Dmitriev has been particularly harsh when discussing the impact of the US 
sanctions on the RDIF and the Russian economy. In the same interview with CNBC, he 
stated, "As a sovereign wealth fund, sanctioning us strongly would create a precedent for 
other sovereign wealth funds to really pull their money out of the US economy. We 
believe that, frankly, sanctions are just a ridiculous thing to begin with, and business is 
against sanctions. But regardless of that we'll continue to work with top investors all over 
the world."270 Dmitriev issues two different threats to the US economy in this respect. He 
first states that putting sanctions on the Russian SWFs will cause other countries’ SWFs 
to move their money from the US. The US has become dependent on the capital that 
SWFs inject into the economy, especially after the 2008 financial crisis. The second 
threat he issues is that Russia will continue to move its money to other countries as the 
US continues restricting its access to markets.  
Another example of Dmitriev’s geopolitical actions is his involvement in the 
Mueller Investigation into Russia’s meddling in the 2016 US Presidential Election. 
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Dmitriev was the Russian representative in the meeting with Trump advisor, Erik Prince. 
This meeting took place in Seychelles a couple of days before Trump’s presidential 
inauguration. The purpose of this meeting was to create a line of communication from 
Trump to Russia. While this meeting did not directly have anything explicitly to do with 
Russia’s SWFs, Dmitriev’s position as the CEO links the RDIF. Furthermore, Dmitriev’s 
role as CEO of RDIF has morphed into a more diplomatic role. It also establishes 
Dmitriev as a political actor working on behalf of President Putin. If Dmitriev is acting 
on the direction of Putin, then the independence of the RDIF is compromised. Putin’s 
motives are inherently political and geopolitical, further making Dmitriev’s motives 
broader than maximizing the returns of RDIF investments. SWFs can be used 
geopolitically when they are led by a geopolitical actor. 
 
Vladimir Putin  
Russian President Vladimir Putin turned SWFs into a political tool. His goal of 
restoring state power included restoring state control over the energy sector.271 At the 
beginning of the Putin Administration, the RSF was amassing large deposits because the 
price of oil was high. However, the RSF provided little opportunity for Putin to utilize the 
funds to benefit his own agenda.  In 2008, Putin announced the split of the RSF into the 
NWF and the RF. The NWF allows Putin greater control over the direction of the 
investments. Most of these investments go to domestic programs such as pensions and 
other fiscal needs.272 The RF provided Putin with the means to increase fiscal spending 
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even when the government faced decreasing revenues. By creating the RDIF, Putin was 
able to better control the direction of investments in Russia because he appoints the CEO 
of the RDIF and has regular meetings with the CEO.  
Putin typically sees the funds as tools to use for a specific political endgame. In 
2008, when speaking to the US Secretary of the Treasury under President Obama, Henry 
Paulson, Putin denied that Russia even had a SWF. He instead insisted that all Russia 
investment in the US was private. He stated: “Since we do not have a sovereign wealth 
fund yet, you are confusing us with someone else… but we are ready to do it, especially 
if you want us to.”273 Putin’s statement indicates that to him, SWFs can be employed in 
any way that the government deems expedient at the time.274 Moreover, he is willing to 
manipulate the purpose of the Russian SWFs in order to convince the US that it is not 
being used for a geopolitical purpose.  
Another way that Putin has influence over the use of the funds is through VEB. 
Putin chaired the bank when he was Prime Minister and can still channel funds through it. 
Putin has been accused of using the NWF to help pay the foreign debts of his friends Igor 
Vyuzin and Sergei Bogdanchikov.275 While these claims are unconfirmed, it 
demonstrates that Putin has the potential to deploy these funds to further his own personal 
agenda.  
Putin has increasingly been moving Russia in a more authoritarian direction.276 It 
is prudent, therefore, to analyze Putin’s motives when deciphering the actions of any 
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extension of the state, including the SWFs. Power-maximization, both domestically and 
internationally, has been a goal of President Putin. Russia’s SWFs are a large source of 
power than he can tap into, as he has multiple ways of indirectly influencing the policies 
of the SWFs. Moreover, Putin has demonstrated his willingness to directly and publically 
use the SWFs for his own domestic and international goals. In sum, Putin can use 
Russia’s SWFs as tools to achieve his policy goals, which could prove to be a threat to 
US national and economic security.  
 
Alexei Kudrin  
Alexei Kudrin, Finance Minister of Russia from 2000-2011, is called the father of 
national wealth in Russia and played a large role in the establishment of SWFs in Russia. 
He was the main opposition of the Putin Administration’s desire to use the funds for 
domestic political reasons.277 He wanted the SWFs to be used strictly to promote long-
term economic growth. He predominately argued for the use of the funds to invest 
outside of Russia because it better protected the country from shocks, like changes in the 
oil price.278 Kudrin’s decision on the most optimal use of the fund was based on which 
investment strategy would produce the greatest returns. His stance was not due to 
political expediency. He did promote using the funds domestically, if it was best for the 
overall economy, such as to create economic development and diversification. In 2009, 
Kudrin defended the injection of money from the NWF into the domestic stock market 
because he believed it would have a “healing effect” on the Russian economy.279 
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Kudrin’s refusal to see the fund as a political tool makes his departure from the 
Finance Ministry significant. Kudrin resigned because the economic interests of Russia 
were degraded in favor of military interests. 280 The SWFs, according to Kudrin, were 
used to cover deficits caused by Russian military intervention in Georgia and Ukraine 
and the US sanctions that resulted from those military campaigns. Kudrin was one of the 
most active players in promoting the SWFs as strictly investment vehicles used to 
maximize returns instead of political tools.  His departure leaves the SWFs vulnerable for 
use as geopolitical weapons or any other political interests of the Kremlin. The departure 
of Kudrin also left the management of the SWFs open and Dmitriev was appointed as 
CEO of the RDIF in 2011. The SWFs are now led by Putin and Dmitriev who both have 
political interests.  
 
3.6: Hyperloop Investment  
An example of failed US regulation in regards to the Russia SWFs is the RDIF’s 
investment in the Hyperloop. Hyperloop is a California-based transportation firm that 
was initially created by Elon Musk. Hyperloop transports people and cargo at airplane 
speeds through “pressurized capsules floating on a frictionless magnetic cushion within 
the tubes.”281 The technology introduces silent, emission-free public transportation. It 
was originally a solo investment of the RDIF, but their second investment in the company 
became a joint investment by the RDIF and the Chinese SWF via their joint investment 
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fund. The investment was for an undisclosed amount.282 The RDIF released a report 
detailing their successful investments as a way to open Russia. That report states that the 
goal of their investment in Hyperloop was to bring the Hyperloop technology to Russia 
for Russian use.283  
Investments by the RDIF are illegal because of the US sanction of VEB, the bank 
that backs the RDIF. The RDIF was able to make two investments into the company after 
the 2014 sanctions against Russia. One of the investments was in April 2016, around the 
same time that the Russian government was interfering in US elections.284 The second 
investment was in October 2017, which was the joint investment with the CIC. Russia 
discovered that one way to circumvent US sanctions and regulations is to channel money 
through other SWFs. The US has no sanctions against China, so the investment was able 
to go through. However, recently US officials have become critical of the investment and 
the RDIF in general. Congress even considered new sanctions on Russia that directly 
targeted the RDIF.285 
 The RDIF’s investment in Hyperloop demonstrates that the regulations the US 
has employed against Russia and all SWFs are not effective. Hyperloop can be 
considered a ‘critical asset’ as it encompasses both technology and infrastructure. The US 
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Treasury Department has made specific regulatory precautions against such investments 
by foreign nations in critical assets. The RDIF’s continued investment in critical assets 
after both regulation and sanctions establishes the failure of current domestic regulation 
to check SWFs.  
 
3.7: Conclusion  
Three conclusions can be drawn from the study of Russia’s SWFs. The first is that 
Russia has the capacity, willingness, and precedent to use its SWFs for geopolitical 
purposes. Russian SWFs were established to further the political goals of the government, 
as the financial and non-financial goals of the funds are ambiguous. Additionally, their 
low degree of independence from the government increases their use to achieve political 
goals. The Russian SWFs do not reflect a shift to neoliberal principles and therefore the 
purpose of the SWFs are determined by the government. Individuals involved in the 
management of the SWFs, Kirill Dmitriev and President Putin, have geopolitical and 
political goals and the SWFs can be used as tools to achieve those goals.  
The second conclusion is that Russian SWFs are expanding Russia’s international 
power and influence. Dmitriev and the RDIF play a diplomatic role in promoting the 
goals and interests of Russia. Increasing relationships between the RDIF and OPEC 
SWFs supplies Russia with an advantage over the US in cultivating influence in the 
Middle East. According to RDIF CEO Dmitriev, the recent agreement with OPEC to 
decrease oil production resulted in a US $65 billion increase in revenue for Russia.286 
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Assets of the Russian SWFs are expected to rise along from the increase in revenue, but 
the numbers have yet to be released to determine how much it will affect the SWFs. With 
an increase in assets, the Russian SWFs will expand in power and influence. If sanctions 
are removed, the price of oil continues to rise, and the domestic use of SWF assets stop, 
there is a greater opportunity for Russia to use the funds to achieve geopolitical motives.  
Lastly, current US domestic regulation does not effectively prevent restricted 
investment nor do international institutions have mechanisms to enforce the rules of 
SWFs.  US regulation of SWFs and US sanctions on the RDIF did not prevent RDIF 
investment in Hyperloop. Hyperloop is part of both the technology and infrastructure 
sectors, which are strategic sectors of the US, making the investment despite sanctions 
more concerning. The lack of transparency and compliance that the Russian SWFs 
exhibits make it difficult to know where they are investing and how much they are 
investing. Both factors are important to know in order to accurately identify when an 
investment is working against the national or economic security of the US.  The IMF and 
the IFSWF are not equipped to enforce transparency and accountability rules. The US is 
without a way of enforcing those rules as well, other than simply cutting off US markets 
to SWFs.  
The US and international regulations of the Russian SWFs are not enough. The 
challenges to reforming current regulation, when keeping the analysis of the Russian 
SWFs in mind, is finding a proper enforcement mechanism. Current regulations of SWFs 
internationally are through the IMF. The IMF has no way of incentivizing Russia to 
comply with the Santiago Principles other than through peer pressure from other SWFs. 
Due to the vast number of partnerships that the RDIF has with other nations’ SWFs, 
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Russia is not likely to receive any pressure from IFSWF countries. Furthermore, many 
nations will push back if Russia is punished because they are linked to the success of the 
RDIF. Host countries, such as the US, must find alternate ways of encouraging the 
Russian SWFs to comply with the Santiago Principles.  
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Chapter 4: Case Study 2 - The Chinese Sovereign Wealth Fund  
 
4.1: Introduction  
As of 2019, China’s SWF manages the second largest amount of total assets of 
any SWF. China established its fund in 2007 due to its large foreign reserve holdings.  
The quick accumulation of assets and worldwide investments by the fund created worry 
about national security, economic sovereignty, and political independence in investment 
host countries.287 Additionally, the Chinese SWF has a low degree of independence from 
the Chinese government. The government’s traditional use of investment and economic 
power to increase foreign influence are a cause for concern, especially in the US. Any 
investment that the fund makes, domestically or internationally, coincides with the 
interests of the Chinese government either implicitly or explicitly.  China’s twofold 
purpose of its SWF, to increase profits and global influence, leads to both an opportunity 
for US companies to obtain long-term investments but also carries with it a geopolitical 
threat to the US.   
 In order to assess the degree of risk and ways to mitigate it, this chapter will first 
describe the structure of the Chinese SWF including its establishment, goals, degree of 
independence from government, and the domestic politics behind the fund. Secondly, it 
will discuss the fund’s transparency, accountability, and compliance with the Santiago 
Principles. Next, the role of China’s SWF during the 2008 financial crisis in the US will 
be examined. Then it will analyze the geopolitical actions of the SWF, both actual and 
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potential. Finally, the Chinese SWF’s investment in US companies and the effect of the 
negative US perception of investment from China will be examined.  
 
4.2: Background on the Fund 
Structure of the Fund  
China has three SWFs, China-SAFE, China-NCSSF, and the China Investment 
Corporation (CIC).  This chapter will focus on the CIC because the CIC is the most 
important Chinese SWF for US economic and national security and is the fund that China 
acknowledges as its official SWF.288 The CIC was established in 2007 and holds US 
$941.4 billion in assets under management as of April 2019 making it the second largest 
SWF in the world with over 10% of total assets in SWFs worldwide.289 Trade surpluses 
capitalize the fund rather than resource rents from commodities like oil.290  Since the 
CIC’s funding comes from foreign currency reserves rather than state revenues from 
natural resource exports, the Chinese government can choose how much money it wants 
to channel into the fund.291 Countries, like Russia, whose funds rely on revenue from 
natural resource exports cannot choose to increase SWF assets. Commodity SWFs are 
vulnerable to natural resource markets to determine the assets that they manage. As of 
September 2018, China has US $3.11 trillion in foreign reserves which the CIC could 
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potentially tap into. The accumulation of assets in the fund, therefore, depends on 
maintaining a fixed exchange rate.292 China did not use equity to establish the CIC. As a 
result, if the Chinese financial sector or global equities decline, it could threaten the 
CIC’s financial stability. Funding for the CIC, then, represents the overall health of the 
Chinese economy.293 The development of the CIC evolved through the overseas 
expansion of Chinese corporations. Establishing a SWF enhanced financial returns of 
foreign exchanges and stabilized the economy in the face of recessions.294 The overall 
structure of the CIC promotes economic stability.  
The CIC is wholly state-owned.295 Three institutions of the Chinese government 
retain control over the CIC: the Chinese State Council, the People’s Bank of China 
(PBoC), and the Ministry of Finance (MOF).296 The CIC is a subsidiary of the MOF. 
Officially, an 11-person board of directors is in charge of CIC activities. An executive 
committee made up of seven people controls day-to-day operations.297 The CIC also has a 
chief executive officer, chief operating officer, and chief risk officer.298 A CIC 
subsidiary, CIC International, manages the overseas investment portfolio.  
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The CIC operates within strict acceptable risks and industrial targets.299 A balance 
between equities, fixed income, and alternate assets in its portfolio gave the fund an 
appearance of commonality. Choosing to make lower risk and low-profile investments, 
the fund avoids any notable failed investments.300  For example, after the fund initially 
incurred negative returns from investments in Morgan Stanley and Blackstone Group 
during the 2008 financial crisis, it refrained from investing in other US financial 
institutions in order to limit losses. Morgan Stanley eventually recovered from the 
financial crisis, but the initial losses from the investment caused substantial domestic 
criticism. Since the short-term losses incurred from those investments, the CIC made an 
effort to diversify away from US financial institutions. By avoiding large or risky 
investments, the CIC increases its domestic popularity and independence. As a result, the 
CIC tends to take a cautious approach to their investment choices outside of China. But 
the CIC’s investments tend to be in strategic sectors of the global economy, which grabs 
the attention of the international community. Those sectors typically have the most secure 
positive levels of returns, making those investments complementary to the CIC’s strict 
investment profit targets.  
 
Establishment & Goals  
There were several reasons China established an SWF. The first was to increase 
the diversification of the Chinese economy.301 Prior to the founding of the CIC, the vast 
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majority of foreign currency reserve assets were held in US government securities.302 
Chinese officials expressed that a desire to increase returns on foreign investments 
motivated the creation of an SWF at the time of its announcement.303 It was also 
speculated that China aimed to create an SWF to reduce inflationary pressures on the 
Chinese economy.304  
When the CIC was first adopted, the PBoC and the MOF competed over control 
of the CIC. As a result, in the infancy of the CIC, most investments were directed toward 
the domestic banking sector.305 Another purpose of the establishment of the CIC was for 
debt financing and it operates as a leveraged investment fund.306 The CIC was created to 
promote economic stability within China as well as profit from its investments. If the CIC 
does not provide that stability, then it does not serve the purpose for which it was 
established.  
The establishment of the CIC in China also represents a geopolitical purpose. 
Establishing a SWF fits into China’s overall effort in its “going global” campaign. Not 
only does the CIC allow the Chinese government to participate in the global economy 
through FDI, but the CIC can also indirectly help Chinese firms and SOEs expand 
externally. At a CIC summit in 2011, the president of the CIC at the time, Gao Xiqing, 
stated, “When China makes overseas investments, it aims to make profits and build 
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influence.”307 The CIC has both commercial and geopolitical purposes when making 
overseas investments. China aims to increase its worldwide influence by providing 
investment from the CIC.  Potential investments, therefore, are evaluated on their ability 
to spread China’s influence throughout the globe, as well as their ability to produce a 
profit.  
The explicit investment goals of the CIC are, at best, opaque which makes 
statements like Xiqing’s an important insight. The CIC’s website mission statement 
contains ambiguous and broad terms to describe the decision-making process of the CIC 
in choosing investments. Top CIC management repeatedly states that the main goal of the 
fund is to maximize the return on investment by making investment decisions that are 
commercially motivated rather than political.308 China promotes the fund in the aftermath 
of the 2008 financial crisis as a tool to create stability in the global market. Consequently, 
the goals of the CIC are twofold: the advancement of the domestic economy and the 
elevation of Chinese influence throughout the global economy and in international 
politics. These two goals, however, are often in conflict with one another.  
One of the goals of the CIC is bolstering the domestic economy. The CIC’s 
ownership of Central Huijin Investment Limited, an investment fund created by the 
central bank, helps achieve that goal through its investments in the Chinese financial 
sector.309 Investments are evaluated based on their potential to bring economic growth to 
the Chinese economy as well. The fund tends to stay away from financial losses and 
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political entanglements in order to build credibility and avoid domestic politics.310 But 
the CIC has little involvement with domestic investments as it concentrates on 
international investment and the Central Huijin Investment Company manages domestic 
assets.  
The goals of the CIC concern the US, as the creation of the fund signals China’s 
desire to transition away from purchasing US government securities to other forms of 
investment. China’s investment diversification could be destabilizing for the US 
economy.311 It also aims to make the RMB a prominent currency of trade, threatening the 
dollar’s current dominance.312 Chinese foreign reserve diversification also means shifting 
its investment focus from US financial institutions to other strategic sectors of the 
economy such as energy, infrastructure, and raw materials that are often concentrated in 
developing nations.   
The goals and establishment of the CIC indicate a fund that aims to minimize 
losses by making financially sound investments. But the CIC’s goals also allude to 
achieving China’s political goals, such as economic stability and national security, 
through the use of the fund. Statements by the leadership also indicate a geopolitical goal 
that aligns with the Chinese government’s “going global” campaign.313 The fund’s 
general opaqueness in its specific investment goals is also a cause for concern, as its 
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investment strategy can be changed to benefit the changing goals of the Chinese 
government.  
 
Degree of Independence  
The creation of the CIC involved a complicated swap transaction with the central 
bank in order to emphasize the CIC’s independence from SAFE and the PBoC.314 
Furthermore, the development of the SWF out of current account surpluses accumulated 
through a fixed exchange rate rather than resource rents lent additional distance from the 
government.315 But the CIC is not substantially independent from the Chinese 
government. The State Council is in control over the CIC and the fund must report all 
their activities to the State Council.316 Members of CIC’s board are, in reality, constantly 
in contact with leaders from the Chinese government.317 CIC’s low degree of 
independence caused the critical evaluation of the security threats of the fund by the US 
government.  
But, the CIC has a small degree of autonomy in its actions because the fund 
became a stronger economic force than its regulating bodies like the PBoC and the 
MOF.318 The State Council, though, has direct control over the fund and therefore the 
CIC has a very low degree of independence overall. Appointment and removal of 
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members in the CIC board are subject to approval by the State Council.319 Lack of 
freedom to choose staff shows a significant loss of independence from the Chinese 
government. Furthermore, there is a revolving door of staffing between the CIC and 
various positions in the Chinese government. For example, in April 2019 the CIC 
announced Peng Chun as the new chairman of the CIC. Peng is a career bureaucrat and 
worked for PBOC in the past.320 The South China Morning Post described Peng as “more 
of a political appointee” to the CIC. Moreover, the two previous CEOs of the CIC took 
jobs in the government when they left the CIC. Lou Jiwei left the fund in 2013 and 
became China’s Finance Minister.321 Ding Xuedong left the fund in 2017 and became the 
Deputy Secretary General for the State Council.322 The CIC’s staff are not far removed 
from the government and it compromises the CIC’s independence. As a result of the low 
degree of independence, the Chinese government retains the liberty to use the fund to 
achieve political or geopolitical goals.  
 The Chinese government’s strong control over the CIC represents the foreign 
involvement in domestic economies that host countries consider to be a threat to national 
security. The State Council controls the flow and creation of financial capital and it, 
therefore, gives the state direct control over where the SWF chooses to invest.323 
Moreover, the tight entanglements between the government and the SWF mean that the 
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success of CIC investments improve the Chinese economy and support the rule of the 
Communist Party of China (CPC).324 The CPC’s vested interest in the success of the CIC 
results in a SWF that is controlled by political interests.  
 
Domestic Politics 
The CPC relies on the continued growth of the economy in order to sustain its 
control and the CIC plays a large role in that growth.325 As a result, the CIC is an 
important institution for the party.  The CIC is in competition with the State 
Administration of Foreign Exchange (SAFE), which manages the foreign exchange 
reserve in China.326 SAFE has its own SWF arm with an extensive foreign investment 
portfolio that includes investments in Australian banks.327 SAFE and the CIC compete 
within each other in order to receive funds from the State Council based on their 
evaluated performances.328  
There is also lots of domestic attention given to the CIC. Investment decisions by 
the CIC are put under a magnifying glass by the Chinese government and the Chinese 
public. Neither of these groups tolerates losses by the fund. The Chinese media heavily 
criticized the CIC for the losses it incurred when it invested in the Blackstone Group in 
2007.329 Pressure from the government and the public to make successful investments 
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with positive returns blocks the CIC from making investments for reasons other than 
commercial merit. Domestic disagreement on the use of the investment fund led to 
mismanagement. In addition to the international opposition to the creation of the CIC, 
there was also domestic opposition.  However, the CIC’s low level of transparency 
usually shields it from domestic criticism. 
Chinese government ideology sometimes influences where the CIC chooses to 
invest. As a government-backed investment fund, the CIC serves as a proxy for the policy 
decisions of the Chinese government. Its role as a proxy is bolstered by its low degree of 
independence from the Chinese government. The CIC was considering investing in 
German-based Dresdner Bank, but ended up withdrawing because of “investment risk 
and political problems.” Political problems were caused by German Chancellor Angel 
Merkel’s visit to the Dalia Lama which is prohibited by Chinese government policy.330 
Investment in the bank would have caused domestic problems for the CIC. In this case, 
the domestic political preference of the Chinese government influenced the investment 
decisions of the CIC. 
 
4.3: Transparency and Compliance with Rules  
Linaburg-Maduell Transparency Index  
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Data Source: The Sovereign Wealth Fund Institute  
The CIC scores 7 out of 10 on the Linaburg-Maduell Transparency Index.331 
China is slightly above average compared to other SWFs in transparency. The average 
score on the Linaburg-Maduell Index is 6. For reference, Norway scores 10 on the index 
and is the next largest holder of assets. The CIC transparency trended upwards from its 
inception in 2007 to 2018. But in 2019, its transparency score was downgraded.  From 
2007-2007, the CIC’s score increased from 3 to 6. From 2009-2010, the CIC’s score 
increased from 6 to 7. From 2010-2014, the CIC’s score increased from 7 to 8. In 2019, 
the Linaburg-Maduell Index downgraded the CIC’s score back to 7.332 When the CIC was 
a relatively new SWF, the continually increasing transparency rating was promising for 
the future of the fund. But the decrease in the fund’s rating in 2019 is concerning for the 
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improvement of the fund as it ages; it indicates that the CIC’s practices changed and 
became less transparent from 2018-2019.  
 
Truman Scoreboard  
The CIC scored 70 out of 100 on the Truman Scoreboard in 2016.333 They rank 
20th out of 60 nonpension SWFs on the scoreboard. China’s fund scores above the 
average score of 62 for that year. For context, the SWF with the most assets, Norway, 
scores a 96. The SWF next below China in assets, UAE, scores a 68.334 The CIC is 
scoring a little above average on the Truman scoreboard but can improve to Norway’s 
gold standard. However, the CIC’s score is increasing on par with the average total 
increase of SWFs.335 Its score increased to 70 in 2016 from 64 in 2012.336 As SWFs in 
aggregate are increasing their accountability and transparency, so is the CIC according to 
the Truman Scoreboard. But, the CIC’s status as the second largest SWF makes the 
difference between its score and Norway’s score notable. The large impact that the CIC 
has on the global economy calls for an increase in transparency and accountability as a 
consequence of its size and power.  
 
Overall Transparency and Accountability  
The CIC discloses its legal relationship to the Chinese government on its website 
and annual reports. But much is still unknown about the CIC’s operational relationship 
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with the government, specifically the MOF and PBoC. Unlike Russia, China, for the most 
part, discloses the amount that it invests in companies.337 But it fails to disclose 
performance evaluations of its investments and information on its investment 
objectives.338  Press releases announcing investments are often lagged, making it difficult 
to pinpoint investment timelines. Annual reports that the CIC publish are brief, 
incomprehensive, and delayed which limits their contribution to transparency.339 
Investments made by the CIC are announced by invested companies rather than the fund. 
But in 2010, the CIC sent the SEC a complete list of its US public equity portfolio. That 
same year it released its first annual report.  
China’s transparency and accountability ratings are, overall, average. For a 
relatively new SWF and a traditionally secretive government, it exceeds Western 
expectations. Additionally, the CIC has greater transparency than China’s other 
investment arm SAFE.340  But the CIC’s status as the second largest SWF warrants a 
higher standard of transparency. The CIC put a cap on its transparency when the 
Chairman of the CIC stated in 2007 that management would not jeopardize the fund’s 
interest for the sake of transparency. It is, therefore, unlikely that the CIC will reach the 
transparency level of Norway’s SWF. Furthermore, after 2012, China stopped disclosing 
its large equity investments outside of China. Its international equity investments may 
now be done by a third party which makes it them harder to track.341  
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The inconsistency of conclusions between the Linaburg-Maduell Transparency 
Index and the Truman Scoreboard regarding the CIC’s growth of accountability and 
transparency makes it difficult to determine if the fund is making an effort to increase 
these qualities. But there are four things that can be concluded from evaluations of the 
CIC. First, the CIC does have room to grow in transparency and accountability according 
to Norway’s levels but seems unwilling. Second, the amount of assets that the CIC holds 
increases its responsibility to be more transparent and accountable. Third, China’s overall 
investment strategy is difficult to determine because of a lack of transparency in terms of 
which sectors the CIC aims to invest in.342 Lastly, the lower transparency score that the 
CIC received on the Linaburg-Maduell Transparency Index in 2019 is worrying for host 
countries as the CIC becomes more powerful.  
 
Santiago Principles Compliance  
The CIC is a founding member of the IFSWF and officially agrees to comply with 
the Santiago Principles.343 The CIC also helped draft the Santiago Principles. On its 
website, the CIC details its compliance with the principles but does not specifically note 
that they are a part of the IFSWF.344 The CIC’s information disclosure on its adherence to 
the Santiago Principles needs to be improved.345 One major principle that the CIC 
violates is independence from the government. As previously discussed, the CIC has an 
extremely low level of independence from the Chinese government. But, for an 
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undemocratic nation, China’s SWF has a high degree of compliance with the Santiago 
Principles. China scores a 3.1 out 10 on the democracy index according to the 
Economist’s Intelligence Unit’s Index of Democracy 2017 but had a 70% compliance 
rate with the Santiago Principles according to the IFSWF in 2010.346 From 2010 to 2013, 
however, the CIC decreased to 61% compliance with the Santiago Principles. Decreasing 
compliance with the principles causes worry for security and stability in potential host 
countries as the CIC increases their assets and influence.   
 
4.4: Role in the 2008 Financial Crisis 
At the onset of the 2008 financial crisis, the CIC invested in failing US financial 
institutions and was dubbed “The Wall Street Savior” by the Wall Street Journal.347 The 
CIC’s actions during the crisis diminished protectionist attitudes of the US and Europe 
towards the fund for a short period after. The CIC supplied much-needed injections of 
capital into many Western financial institutions. It became a stabilizing force in an 
extremely volatile financial system. At the beginning of the crisis in the US in late 2007, 
China purchased 9.9% of Morgan Stanley. For a newly established SWF, a US $5 billion 
investment was a substantial risk.348 Additionally, the CIC invested US $200 million in 
Visa and US $3 billion in the Blackstone Group at its initial public offering in 2007. 
China’s SWF was not the only SWF that invested in US financial institutions during the 
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financial crisis. Various Asian and Middle Eastern SWFs invested a total of US $200 
billion by 2008. The CIC’s investment in Morgan Stanley and Blackstone ended poorly 
for the fund in the immediate aftermath as it incurred large short-term losses from the 
investments.349 But long-term, the CIC’s US $5.6 billion stake in Morgan Stanley ended 
up bringing in a substantial profit as shares rose 10% by 2019.350 
China recognizes the substantial role that it played during the crisis. The country 
credits itself with easing US economic failure and promotes its increased importance to 
the US economy as a result.351 The Chairman of the CIC claims that the CIC’s aim is to 
stabilize the economy because of its role during the crisis. China’s investment in US 
financial institutions during their time of need has not been overlooked by the US. The 
US turned to China as a stable investor in times of economic instability after the crisis. 
Protectionist attitudes towards the CIC diminished during the period following the crisis, 
making it easier for the CIC to invest in Western markets.352 Mostly due to the Trump 
Administration’s rhetoric toward China, the good opinion of Chinese investment has 
shifted since the end of the crisis.  
The CIC’s actions during the 2008 financial crisis also have geopolitical 
consequences, whether they were intended or not.  Massive investments into the financial 
sector during a time of global economic vulnerability provided China with increased 
power over financial resources, which in turn grants them influence in the US. With their 
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increased control, China can influence the economy by promoting its ideological 
preferences and advancing its own economic policy.353 Regardless of whether China 
intended to have this effect when they made the investments, the geopolitical advantage 
remains.  
 
4.5: Geopolitical Actions  
The two most notable reasons why the CIC is seen as both a commercial and a 
political body is because of the fund’s lack of independence from the Chinese 
government and because the CIC invests most prominently in strategic sectors. Financial, 
energy, information technology, consumer discretionary, and consumer staples made up 
70% of the CIC’s investment portfolio in mid-2013.354 China’s position as a strategic 
investor means that it pursues investments that will increase national security threats to 
host countries and further domestic political goals rather than just commercial profits. 
China uses its SWF as both a tool of soft power as well as a blunt economic weapon.355  
 
US Concerns 
There is little direct evidence of China using the CIC for geopolitical reasons, but 
there still is a large potential for the geopolitical use of the fund. The US has three 
concerns regarding the CIC. First, the US is skeptical that the CIC’s investments are 
based on merit and projection of long-term profits and are not politically motivated.356 
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The second concern is related to the CIC’s ‘passive’ investments.357 Long-term 
investments, like the ones CIC makes, create a dependence on Chinese investment. 
Greater dependence allows China a greater ability to disrupt the US economy.  The third 
concern is due to the CIC concentrating its investments in what the US defines as 
‘strategic’ sectors of the economy such as energy and technology. When the CIC was 
established, the ability of China to gain control over key industries or acquire user rights 
of natural resources concerned the US. But investment in US technology is now proving 
to pose a more pressing threat.  The FBI identified Chinese economic espionage, such as 
stealing US technology, as a critical threat to economic and national security in 2018.358 
China exploits American technology to develop its own economy, compromising the 
earned American advantage.359 Current backlash and investigations from the US 
regarding Chinese hacking and spying operations could cause China to look for more 
legitimate ways of obtaining American technology. Investing in American technology 
companies through the CIC presents China with an opportunity to access this technology.  
Strategic sectors, like technology, also tend to have the most stable rates of return and 
therefore geopolitical motives may not be all that causes the CIC to invest in those 
sectors. But the threat of technology theft from China is a major threat to the US and the 
CIC could be used as a vehicle for it.  
 
Constraints 
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Asian SWFs typically have domestic constraints that make it difficult for them to 
be used as geopolitical tools. There are various interests that compete for sovereign 
wealth and as a result, it is difficult for the SWFs of these nations to have a single 
investment strategy.360 China’s SWFs are constrained by these pressures and cannot be 
easily deployed as a geopolitical strategy.361 The CIC, in particular, cannot access 
additional funds from the foreign exchange reserves if it is not profitable. But all 
governments have geopolitical motives and the CIC’s low degree of independence makes 
it more vulnerable to exploitation for geopolitical goals.  
Furthermore, of the CIC’s US $914 billion dollars in assets, only US $196 billion 
are foreign assets. Most of the CIC’s investments are channeled toward domestic uses 
rather than investments abroad.362 Only 24% of assets are deployed abroad, causing the 
fund’s monetary influence to diminish outside of China. Domestic assets also have higher 
rates of returns than foreign investments. Foreign assets have grown by 5% to US $196 
billion over the last three years, but domestic assets have doubled to US $614 billion.363 
Because of China’s strict guidelines on maximizing returns, foreign assets are more likely 
to be traded for domestic assets. When fewer assets are internationally deployed, there 
are fewer opportunities to use the CIC to achieve geopolitical goals. But domestic 
investment also serves a political purpose. Investment by the CIC into the domestic 
economy strengthens China’s economy and consequently the CPC. While there may be 
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certain restraints on the geopolitical use of the CIC, the low degree of independence 
guarantees its use as a political tool by the CPC.  
 
Diplomacy 
There are several potential uses of the CIC for the Chinese government that 
concern the US. The first is as a political bargaining chip in Chinese diplomacy. Because 
the CIC manages a large amount of assets, its investment potential raises China’s status 
and the power that China has in the international economic and political arena. As the 
main competitor of the United States for global influence, China’s economic power 
through the CIC poses a major threat to US foreign policy implementation.  
China’s SWFs are a key aspect of modern-day Chinese diplomacy.364 Potential 
investment is a motivator, especially in developing countries, to acquiesce to China’s 
foreign policy or cultivate friendly relations with China. Chinese influence on US foreign 
policy due to the US debt that China owns, is seen as a vehicle of diplomacy by the 
international community due to the increased alignment of the two countries.365 The 
CIC’s investment in the Blackstone Group propelled its co-founder, Stephen 
Schwarzman, to a diplomatic role between the US and China.366 Schwarzman served as 
an informal economic advisor to President Trump. Chinese President Xi Jinping relied on 
Schwarzman as an informal link to the Trump Administration.367 Schwarzman’s 
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consistent message to President Trump at the beginning of the administration was to keep 
the importance of the China-US economic relationship in mind.368 The CIC’s investment 
in Blackstone succeeded in encouraging the US to remain friendly to Chinese economic 
interests for a short period of time. Despite his fiery campaign statements against the US 
economic relationship with China, directly after his inauguration in 2017 Trump adopted 
a warmer diplomatic relationship with China and President Xi.369   
But Schwarzman’s influence over Trump seems limited due to the escalating 
trade war that began between the US and China in 2018. The relationship between Trump 
and Xi flipped when the US implemented ‘global safeguard tariffs’ in February 2018 and 
tariffs specifically against Chinese products in March of 2018. Also in March of 2018, 
the CIC ended their 11-year investment in the Blackstone Group.370 The reason for the 
sale of the CIC’s stake in the firm was undisclosed, as well as the size of the stake.371 
When Blackstone went public, the CIC purchased a 9.9% stake in the firm, a US $3 
billion investment.  
 It is unclear whether China was sending a message to Trump and his allies by 
terminating its Blackstone investment, but it does indicate that China has the potential to 
use CIC investments to send political messages to the US government. However, since 
the CIC’s divestment of Blackstone, the fund has been quiet.372 The CIC could be taking 
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a cautious approach to their US investments because of difficult relations with the US or 
because it went without a chairman from February 2017 to Peng’s succession in March 
2019.373 
 
Influence on Portfolio Companies 
Influence on portfolio companies is a major national and economic security threat 
that SWFs pose to the US. But this is not a geopolitical strategy that the CIC has 
deployed thus far. The CIC has a growing overseas investment portfolio of strategic 
minority stakes but does not actively take seats on boards of their investments.374 For 
example, the CIC declined taking seats on the boards of Morgan Stanley and the 
Blackstone Group, two US-based financial institutions, in 2007. Schwarzman, the CEO 
of Blackstone, described the deal with the CIC as “purely commercial.”375 The fund also 
refrained from taking controlling stakes in foreign companies, especially in the US.376 By 
taking minority stakes, China avoids suspicion from US politicians. The CIC makes a 
majority of its investment through a third party to limit direct interaction with 
companies.377 As passive investors, the CIC is motivated by long-term returns and small 
risk.378 Because of this goal, it tends to gravitate toward minority stake investments. 
Moreover, purchasing minority stakes does not require US government approval.  Even 
though the CIC had the potential and opportunity to have influence over its portfolio 
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companies, it declined to do so for commercial reasons. But the opportunity is still 
available for China to take advantage of.  
When German Chancellor Angela Merkel visited China in 2007, Chinese officials 
told her that the CIC had no intention of buying strategic stakes in big Western 
companies, infrastructure, overseas airlines, telecommunications, or oil companies.379 
While the CIC has not purchased majority stakes in these Western sectors, it has still 
invested in them, especially in infrastructure. Specifically, the CIC invested in water and 
airports in Britain, power providers in France, and toll roads in Australia.380 These 
investments are in accordance with the goals of the Belt and Road Initiative to connect 
China with both Western Europe and Australia.  
 
Soft Power Capacity  
The CIC’s opportunity to promote Chinese power has been primarily through soft 
power.381 The State Council can choose to use the fund to promote Chinese foreign 
policy goals. Because the fund can bestow substantial investments on companies and 
countries, it carries the ability to spread the CPC’s message, influence, and foreign policy 
goals throughout the world. Soft power remains a cornerstone of US foreign policy. 
Competition with China for influence in developing countries will become more difficult 
for the US because it does not have a fund of that size. For example, the CIC’s alignment 
with the goals of the Chinese government’s Belt Road Initiative allows China to use soft 
power through the CIC, a point which will be expanded on later in the chapter.  
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The SWF can also obtain information about overseas economies and influence the 
economic policies of the host countries through their investments.382 The CIC has access 
to over a trillion US dollars. They could purchase top US companies and, consequently, 
wield significant power in the US economy.383 If the CIC decided to take board positions 
in the future, it could have access to sensitive technology. Soft power can also be used to 
pressure invested companies to promote China’s economic prospects and the financial 
status of other Chinese companies.384 Access to technology, especially relating to nuclear 
weapons, is a specific concern of the US regarding SWFs in general.  
The CIC can also unintentionally wield soft power.385 Concerns over the CIC’s 
ability to harness soft power increased when it invested in major financial institutions at 
the onset of the financial crisis because it provided economic stability.386 It is unclear if 
the Chinese intended to influence the perception of China through their investments 
during the 2008 financial crisis. Furthermore, it is unknown if those investments helped 
the long-term perception of the CIC by providing market stability or hurt it by appearing 
as opportunistic. But, the CIC’s investments in Western financial institutions during the 
2008 financial crisis improved public opinion of the fund throughout the world for a short 
period of time. They succeeded in rehabilitating the image of the CIC for at least a short 
time in the US and for a longer period in Western Europe.  
 
Strategic Sector Targeting  
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The CIC’s investment choices have indicated its desire to target certain strategic 
sectors of the global economy such as natural resources, materials, energy, and financial 
services.387 China’s goal to achieve energy security is a huge driving force behind the 
CIC’s portfolio composition.388 The energy sector is the CIC’s second largest investment 
target, representing about 30% of its investment portfolio in mid-2013.389 Annual reports 
from the CIC show that it increased investment in natural resources throughout the 
supply chain over the past couple of years.390 Shortages in energy are constraining 
China’s social and economic development. Energy investments help China pursue its 
“going global” strategy, but it also brings attention to China’s investments due to the 
energy sector’s status as a strategic sector. Energy is vitally important for a country as it 
impacts every citizen and the economy’s potential for growth. Countries fear that China’s 
investment in their domestic energy could make them a vehicle for China’s geopolitical 
goals.391 The CIC’s investment projects were almost exclusively related to energy from 
2010-2012. After 2012, the CIC still invested heavily in the energy sector but diversified 
more into infrastructure and technology. 
Furthermore, investment in energy is not completely commercially sound. Energy 
prices fluctuate often in global markets, making the profitability of these investments 
uncertain. As China invests more into energy, its economy is more influenced by 
international energy prices.392 The commercial vulnerability of energy investments 
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alludes to a political motive behind the CIC’s large quantity of energy investments.  
China’s interest in investing in energy is inherently geopolitical as it encompasses both 
energy security and China’s “going global” strategy. Furthermore, the CIC’s investment 
in energy is symbolic of China’s state power which aggravates the perception of the fund 
as a geopolitical actor and the use of the CIC as a tool for the CPC’s political ends.  
The CIC’s investments also target both upstream and downstream utilities and the 
logistics sector.393 China’s main economic weaknesses lie in its need to access raw 
materials from other markets. Its investment choices indicate a political motive in 
assuring China’s access to natural resources that are essential to the continuance of 
China’s economic development. China often uses the CIC to exert influence in the 
developing world, and increasingly in Southern and Eastern Europe.394 The CIC’s 
emphasis on investing in energy and raw materials led to a new interest in investments in 
Mongolia, Brazil, Vietnam, South Africa, Kazakhstan, and Russia.395 Russia became a 
large target for CIC investment, both SWFs signed a Memorandum of Understanding to 
promote future cooperation on infrastructure projects in Russia.396 Increasing the number 
of natural resources that China can access increases economic stability and contributes to 
China’s national security. Investing in infrastructure provides China with more political 
clout and a strong relationship with the host country. The CIC’s shift in investment 
strategy demonstrates the increasing prevalence of political motives within the fund.  
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The Belt and Road Initiative 
In the CIC’s 2017 annual report, it stated that the CIC “aligned our investments 
and services with the Belt and Road initiative (BRI).”397 The BRI is aimed at increasing 
infrastructure, trade, and investment links between China and nations of Southeast Asia, 
the Gulf Countries, North Africa, and Europe.398 Chinese President Xi Jinping launched 
the initiative to increase China’s influence in those regions, especially in Southeast 
Asia.399 The CIC also is involved in the BRI because it is a shareholder of the Silk Road 
Fund. China’s Silk Road Fund is a state-owned investment fund established in 2014 and 
manages US $40 billion. 400 The Silk Road Fund is not a SWF and its purpose is strictly 
for the implementation of BRI through funding for trade and economic cooperation and 
connectivity.401 The CIC owns a 15% share in the fund, greater entangling the BRI and 
the SWF.  
Investments through this initiative represent mostly geopolitical goals, rather than 
financial goals. The initiative aims to increase China’s global political and economic 
power and influence by bolstering its role in the global trade network. 402 BRI aims to 
make China a hub of finance and commerce. China’s motive behind the BRI and the 
CIC’s aligned strategy is a major geopolitical benefit of the SWF. Moreover, it also 
signals that China under Xi aims to increase its global influence using investment from 
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China into these regions. Due to the lack of independence that the CIC has from the Xi 
Administration and the statement of alignment with BRI, it can be assumed that the CIC 
will be used as a tool to achieve the BRI’s geopolitical goals.  
In March 2019, Vice Chairman of the CIC, Tu Guangshao, announced an 
additional connection between BRI and the CIC called the Belt and Road Cooperation 
Fund. He stated, “China Investment Corporation, the country's sovereign wealth 
investment fund, is seeking global partners to jointly establish a special cross-border 
investment instrument which will further finance Belt and Road projects.”403 China 
Daily, a daily newspaper owned by the CPC and published in English, notes that a 
cooperation fund prohibits host governments from imposing restrictions on any single 
member. A probable cause of the CIC’s search for partners is to avoid restrictions from 
host countries who fear the use of CIC within the BRI to increase economic power within 
the host country. A SWF cooperation fund with China was used by Russia to invest in the 
US, despite sanctions placed on the fund. The creation of the BRI Cooperation Fund 
indicates that China wants to ramp up BRI investments abroad and extend the CIC’s role 
in the BRI. Partnering with other countries for these investments externally strengthens 
China’s power at a time when the US’s economic relationship with its allies is 
weakening. 
 
4.6: US Investments 
Unocal 
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American public distrust of Chinese state-owned enterprise investments is an 
enduring theme. In 2005, the China National Offshore Oil Corporation (CNOOC) 
attempted to acquire the Unocal Corporation, a US-based oil company, causing public 
outrage.404 While the CNOOC is not an SWF, it is a Chinese SOE like the CIC and 
reflects US public sentiment regarding investment from China. CNOOC reported its 
investment bid withdrawal because of resistance from US politicians who claimed the 
investment would be a risk to national security and fair trade.405 Unocal, headquartered in 
Los Angeles, had seismic technology which China could have used to develop its nuclear 
weapons research.406  But a spokesperson for Unocal stated that all work using seismic 
technology by the company was contracted to outside firms. Access to sensitive 
technology, according to Unocal, was not a potential consequence of CIC investment in 
this case.  
 Resistance from policymakers may have been driven by lobbying from 
American-owned Chevron Corporation. Chevron also made a bid for the company, but 
the CIC had made a higher bid for Unocal.  Chevron hired lobbyists to influence public 
opinion and urge politicians to block the CNOOC bid. The threat, in this case, was the 
economic security of US companies when outbid by companies owned by the Chinese 
government. The case of the Unocal blocked investment demonstrates the negative public 
and government perception of investment from China in the US. Investments from the 
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CIC face additional barriers to accessing the US markets because of this negative 
perception. Increased critical attention on Chinese investment makes it harder for the CIC 
to invest in US companies.   
 
Goldman Sachs Cooperation Fund 
In November of 2017, Goldman Sachs announced a strategic relationship with the 
CIC in the form of a cooperation fund. The China-US Industrial Cooperation Partnership 
aimed to increase commercial links and market access between China and the US. The 
partnership between the CIC and Goldman Sachs fits within China’s stated goal of using 
overseas investments to build influence.407 In addition to the use of the cooperation fund 
to increase Chinese investment in the US, the partnership will host summits of business 
leaders, policy-makers, and investors from the two countries to “strengthen business and 
commercial ties between the two countries.”408 The CIC’s investment partnership with 
Goldman Sachs bolstered its access to, and therefore influence in, US markets.  
 
Other Investments in the United States  
Initial investments of the CIC in 2007 were exclusively in US financial 
institutions:  Blackstone, Visa, and Morgan Stanley. Its investment in Visa resulted in 
positive returns, while its investments in Blackstone and Morgan Stanley initially resulted 
in negative returns. The CIC entered into a joint venture with US private equity firm, JC 
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Flowers, to invest in US financial assets.409 Since the fund expanded, the CIC moved 
away from the US and into domestic investments and investments in other Asian 
countries as those investments yielded better returns.  
In November of 2009, the CIC invested in the US energy sector with its 
investment AES Corporation which supplies wind generation.  The CIC has invested 
around $14.4 billion in the US, excluding its investment in EIG Global Energy Partners 
LLC for an undisclosed amount.410 Its investment in Blackstone, as previously 
mentioned, brought it substantial short-term political influence in the Trump 
Administration through the CEO of Blackstone. The CIC appears to refrain from 
investing in the US military and defense technology to avoid American suspicion.411 
Because the US government blocked numerous investments by Chinese companies, the 
CIC is very cautious about where it chooses to invest in the US.  Investing large amounts 
in the US gives China substantial soft power within the US.  
 
Negative Perceptions of Chinese Investments in the US 
 Economic protectionism aimed at China and the CIC is not limited to the Trump 
Administration. After China established the CIC, a report by Congress outlined potential 
policy responses to the creation of the fund. The report highlighted the protectionist 
tendencies of the US against investment from China.412 It also suggested that the US 
should reevaluate and reform domestic laws that define the sectors in which SWFs can 
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invest and how much they can invest in US companies. Hostile behavior towards the CIC 
from the beginning of its establishment caused the CIC to be cautious when deciding 
which investments it would make in the US and if it would invest at all.  
During the Obama Administration in 2013, CIC Chairman Lou Jiwei stated at the 
18th National Congress of the Communist Party of China that protectionism in Western 
countries was blocking the CIC’s ability to participate in the global economy.413 The CIC 
began to push back against such protectionism, declaring it would not invest anywhere 
not welcoming to its investment. Furthermore, the fund began to search for more 
investment opportunities in Asia instead of the West. Increased protectionism and 
barriers to investment in the US leads to decreased assets invested in the US which could 
become problematic in the future.  
 
4.7: Conclusion 
Perhaps the most concerning aspect of the CIC for the US is the implicit shift in 
economic power from the West to the East resulting from the immense amount of assets 
the CIC controls.414 Given the CIC’s unique amount of working capital, it has the ability 
to destabilize the US economy.415 Unlike the case of the Russian SWFs, the use of the 
CIC for geopolitical purposes is somewhat direct. Both the leadership of the CIC and 
statements of the CIC declare that the fund’s purpose is to spread Chinese influence 
throughout the world as well as turn a profit. Deploying the CIC’s vast assets around the 
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world in geopolitically strategic areas allows China to encroach on Western power with 
its own economic soft power.  
Thus far, it is unclear if the use of the CIC geopolitically directly causes harm to 
the US. Indirectly, the CIC diminishes the ability of the US to have a monopoly on soft 
power.  But, directly, the CIC avoids investing in security sectors of the US economy, 
preferring to take minority stakes in less controversial sectors to limit attention from US 
politicians. Domestic politics and strict risk guidelines limit the fund’s capacity to invest 
internationally. Furthermore, the recent protectionist policies of the US contribute more 
to the CIC’s inability to invest in American companies. The United Kingdom welcomed 
investment from the CIC and received investments in transportation infrastructure and 
investment in the financial sector. By remaining hostile to investments from the CIC, the 
US risks investments going to other countries like the United Kingdom.   
The transparency and accountability of the CIC is an issue, like the Russian 
SWFs. Decreasing transparency ratings make it harder for the US to track patterns of 
investments. But the size of the CIC compared to SWFs like Russia’s also increases the 
need for greater transparency and accountability. It also holds the fund to a higher 
standard comparable to Norway. Additionally, over the past few years, China seemed 
unwilling to increase the transparency of the fund to reach the level of the Norwegian 
fund. On paper, the CIC is generally compliant with the Santiago Principles except for 
independence from the government.  Use of the fund by the Chinese government for 
political purposes, though, is directly contrary to the Santiago Principles’ guidelines. 
China’s status as a member of the IFSWF increases the difficulty of reprimanding the 
CIC for acting geopolitically or for its lack of independence from the Chinese 
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government. Current international regulation of SWFs is not sufficient to prevent SWFs, 
like the CIC, from acting politically or geopolitically.  
It is important the fund remains regulated by an international body because it is 
used for geopolitical reasons and has a very low degree of independence from the 
Chinese government. But, the hostility from the Trump Administration prevents the CIC 
from the possibility of investing substantially in the US. Even though it is a competitive 
threat to the economic stability and soft power capability of the US, the CIC provides 
opportunities for investment in US infrastructure and energy. The political nature of the 
fund, although, means any investment in the US will serve a political purpose for the 
CPC as well as a commercial one. For this reason, the US and the world will need to keep 
a cautious eye on the China Investment Corporation.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
112 
 
Chapter 5: Case Study 3 – The Saudi Arabian Sovereign Wealth Fund 
5.1 Introduction  
The US’s political relationship with Saudi Arabia is entangled with its energy 
interests.416 The foundation of the relationship is based on Saudi Arabia providing the US 
with oil, and the US guaranteeing Saudi Arabia’s security.417 Protecting Saudi Arabia and 
American access to oil is a major element of US foreign policy.418 The economic 
partnership goes both ways; Saudi Arabia supplies the US with oil and the US supplies 
Saudi Arabia with arms. Since 1950, the US has sold US $90 billion in arms to Saudi 
Arabia.419 The US’s relationship with Saudi Arabia was put under pressure after 9/11. 
Saudi citizens constituted 15 out of 19 plane hijackers of the four commercial airlines 
used in the attacks on New York and Washington D.C. as well as the plane brought down 
in Pennsylvania. In 2016, Congress passed legislation allowing families of 9/11 victims 
to sue the Saudi government. The Saudi government threatened economic retaliation for 
the action.420 Despite those incidents, Saudi Arabia and the US maintained strong ties due 
to their mutual economic and national security reliance.  
The strong US-Saudi economic ties extend to the kingdom’s newly established 
SWF. Most of the fund’s foreign investments are in the US, concentrated in the 
technology sector. But recent events altered US-Saudi friendly relations and impacted 
international perceptions of the Saudi SWF. Increased scrutiny of the country caused 
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many to question the motives of the increasingly aggressive SWF and its chair, de facto 
leader of Saudi Arabia, Crowned Prince Mohammed bin Salman (MbS). 
Over the last two years, Saudi Arabia controlled one of the most active SWF 
investment vehicles.421 Only officially launched in 2015, Saudi Arabia’s SWF is the sixth 
largest fund.422 The rapid accumulation of assets by the fund captured the attention of 
Silicon Valley, but also US security concerns. Saudi Arabia’s autocratic regime, heavy 
SWF investment in US strategic sectors, and shift away from US influence produce 
national and economic threats to the US. In order to assess the threat the Saudi SWF 
poses to the US, this chapter will first provide background on the fund. It will discuss the 
establishment of the SWF in Saudi Arabia, its goals and objectives, transparency, 
independence from the government, projections of future growth, and domestic 
constraints. Next, the geopolitical motives of the fund will be examined with an emphasis 
on how the fund fits within Saudi Arabia’s Vision 2030. Then this chapter will analyze 
the fund’s investments in the US. Finally, the effect of MbS’s involvement in the murder 
of Washington Post journalist Jamal Khashoggi on the Saudi Arabia SWF will be 
considered.  
  
5.2 Background on the Fund 
Establishment 
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Saudi Arabia has an atypical SWF history. The kingdom did not designate an 
investment vehicle as its SWF until 2009.  Before it had a SWF, the Saudi Arabian 
Monetary Agency (SAMA), the central bank, managed the country’s foreign assets.423 
Until 2015, SAMA was responsible for managing the foreign reserves and accumulated 
wealth.424 The absence of a SWF was unusual for a member of the Gulf Cooperation 
Council (GCC). In 2007 over half of all SWF assets were held in the GCC countries of 
Kuwait, UAE, Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, Qatar, and Oman. The combination of rising 
populations and oil-dependent economies made GCC countries prime candidates to 
establish and benefit from SWFs. Saudi Arabia hesitated in establishing a SWF because 
of the negative outlook on SWFs by the US.425 SWFs were labeled as suspicious actors 
before the 2008 financial crisis, and Saudi investment in the US benefitted from not 
carrying the SWF label. Before Saudi Arabia launched its SWF, its foreign assets 
denominated in dollars supported the alliance with the US.426 Saudi-US relations caused 
the kingdom to hesitate in establishing a SWF, as previously investments into the US 
were made to enhance relations.  
The current Saudi Arabian SWF, the Public Investment Fund (PIF), was 
established by a royal decree in 1971 as an arm of the Finance Ministry but did not serve 
the function of a SWF until 2009.427 The objective of the PIF pre-2009 was to invest in 
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domestic commercial projects and develop the domestic economy.428   The main function 
of the PIF was simply to give loans.429 In April 2008, Saudi Arabia disclosed its intention 
to establish a SWF.430 Also in 2008, the PIF was granted the ability to invest in foreign 
corporations.431 Saudi Arabia announced the creation of a SWF by the name of Sanabil 
al-Saudia in 2009.432 Sanabil operated as an arm of the PIF with starting capital of US $5 
billion. The fund was small, indicating Saudi Arabia still wanted to keep a low-profile in 
its international investments.433  
Effective in 2015, oversight of the PIF was transferred from the Ministry of 
Finance to the Council of Economic and Development Affairs and began its official 
operation as a SWF.434 During the restructuring of the PIF, MbS was designated 
Chairman of the PIF. The goal in establishing the PIF as the official SWF was to create 
an investment body that could take on higher risks and initiate more economic 
diversification than the conservative SAMA.435 The shift in investment directive from 
SAMA to the PIF signaled that the Saudi Arabian government wanted to make riskier 
investments and play a larger role in initiating FDI.436 The pressure put on the 
                                               
428 "GCC Sovereign Wealth Fund Activity Picks up," Oxford Business Group, April 05, 2018, accessed 
March 19, 2019, https://oxfordbusinessgroup.com/analysis/money-management-activity-among-region’s-
sovereign-wealth-funds-picks-oil-prices-0. 
429 England and Kerr.   
430 Diwan, 346.  
431 Castelli and Scacciavillani, 39.  
432 Castelli and Scacciavillani, 39.  
433 Gawdat Bahgat, "Sovereign Wealth Funds in the Persian Gulf States," in The Oxford Handbook of 
Sovereign Wealth Funds (New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 2018). 
434 Oxford Business Group.  
435 Fei, Xu, and Ding.  
436 Karen E. Young, Saudi Arabia’s Sovereign Wealth Fund: Borrowing Money to Make Money? report 
(American Enterprise Institute). 
116 
 
government by its younger constituency to create more jobs and diversify away from oil 
also contributed to its more aggressive investment style.437 
 
Goals and Objectives 
The goals and objectives of the Saudi fund differ from those of Russia or China’s 
funds because of the vital role oil revenue plays in Saudi Arabia. While the Russian 
economy is highly influenced by the energy sector, the Saudi economy is wholly 
dependent on it.438 The Saudi government is entirely funded by oil revenue, rather than 
income taxes.439 Investing those revenues is essential in preparing for the exhaustion of 
oil reserves.440 The PIF is responsible for the long-term prosperity of the Saudi economy 
beyond its oil-production years.  
 Saudi Arabia invested cautiously with its oil reserves in the past.441 Most of 
SAMA’s investments were made in low-yield bonds and primarily US Treasury bills.442 
The objectives of Saudi investment in the past were to increase its good relations with the 
US and avoid suspicion in its investments.443 The newly restructured the PIF’s objectives 
are investing half its reserves abroad and half in strategic domestic projects, therefore, 
diversifying the Saudi economy away from oil.444 
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Recently, the PIF made riskier investments and also took out loans in order to 
increase the fund’s holdings.445 Channeling money into the PIF became a goal of the 
Saudi government as part of its Vision 2030 campaign.446 The fund aims to complete a 
dozen large projects and create thousands of jobs, with the end objective of adding 
billions of dollars to the domestic economy.447 MbS restructuring the PIF into a more 
traditional SWF signaled Saudi Arabia’s openness to foreign investment from emerging 
markets as well.448 The primary goal of the PIF is to bring foreign capital, technology, 
and skills to Saudi Arabia.449 Saudi Arabia has a young population and is extremely 
dependent on oil revenues. The PIF is essential to bring jobs and diversification to Saudi 
Arabia to help prepare for the eventual exhaustion of oil reserves. 
 
Transparency  
Saudi Arabia established a SWF with the declared purpose of increasing 
transparency in its investments.450 Many experts predicted the creation of the SWF would 
increase transparency in Saudi Arabia and its foreign investments because of the shift 
from multiple private SWFs to one public one.451 Diwan argues Saudi Arabia’s 
announcement of a SWF indicated a desire to increase transparency and accountability.452 
But Diwan’s prediction developed under the assumption that King Abdullah would be the 
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executive of the state and the fund.453 When the PIF officially launched, MbS wielded 
authority over the fund.   
The actual implementation of the fund increased transparency very little, if at all. 
The SWFI gave the PIF a transparency rating of 7 and SAMA 4 on the Linaburg-Maduell 
Transparency Index. Both scores are low for a SWF of that size.454 The IMF reported that 
deciphering how borrowing and investment decisions are coordinated is difficult due to 
the ambiguity of the fund.455 How the PIF finances investments is unclear as well as to 
what extent current commitments have been funded.456 The lack of financing 
transparency is significant considering the questions surrounding how the PIF will 
finance the ambitious mandate of Vision 2030.457 
The Truman Scoreboard did not rank the PIF in 2016 because the fund was not 
established as a SWF until 2015.458 But Truman wanted to include the PIF on the 
scoreboard. There was no information at the time on the PIF, and thus would have 
received a 0. A year after the investment body became a SWF, the management of the 
fund had yet to publish any information about the fund.459 Moreover, after the PIF set up 
the website, management failed to publish quarterly data. Staffing and leadership changes 
are also difficult to track, making it hard to discern the changing investment strategy of 
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the PIF.460 Even though the PIF is a fairly new SWF, it is severely behind in terms of 
transparency. Three years of activity by the fund and the large amount of assets the fund 
manages warrants a huge increase in transparency. Lack of SWF transparency causes 
security concerns from host countries. Transparency is required by the Santiago 
Principles. Saudi Arabia participated in the creation of those guidelines as a permanent 
observer even though it did not have a SWF at the time.461 However, while the PIF is not 
an official member of the IFSWF, its participation in the formation of the Santiago 
Principles makes the fund responsible for following the guidelines.  
 
Independence from Government  
 Saudi Arabia’s economy developed through state-controlled and government-
driven growth. Even before the PIF was established, the management of sovereign wealth 
was directed by the state; SAMA was directed to invest oil revenues. SAMA by nature of 
also operating as the central bank had almost no independence from the Saudi 
government.462 Saudi Arabia is an absolute monarchy. As a result, all government 
institutions have very low independence from the monarch.  Hence, the SWF can be used 
by the monarch to achieve his goals.  
Because the PIF was established by a royal decree in 1971, it has a very low 
degree of independence from government. There is no separation from the state as the de 
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facto head of state, MbS, is also the chair of the SWF.463 MbS started a campaign to 
consolidate power in Saudi Arabia and controlling the PIF is a major tool he uses to 
control the economy.464 Control over the PIF also affords him significant international 
influence. After MbS announced his plan to privatize Saudi Aramco, bankers and stock 
exchange officials around the world aimed to court the Prince.465 A Saudi analyst 
described the fund as a “one man investment vehicle.”466 MbS uses the PIF as his primary 
tool in implementing his personal, economic, and social goals for Saudi Arabia.467 The 
Prince is attempting to shape the economic direction of Saudi Arabia through his control 
over the PIF. As a result, the PIF’s investment decisions are similar to the leadership style 
of MbS, unpredictable.468  
Moreover, many Western managers of the fund abandoned their large salaries at 
the PIF due to MbS’s controlling grip on the fund. The British compliance manager, 
Swiss chief of public investments, and the Spanish private-equity associate all left their 
jobs after only a short period of time working at the PIF.469 Dutch Eric Ebermeyer served 
as head of strategy for only weeks before leaving the PIF because MbS controlled so 
much of the fund’s strategy.470 According to the Wall Street Journal, people compare 
their experience working at the PIF to the movie “A Hologram for the King.” The 
metaphor compares the experience of the protagonist of the movie waiting to pitch a sale 
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of technology to the Saudi King, only to be rejected.471 Instead of being rejected by the 
Saudi King, investment pitches are rejected by the Saudi Prince. Strategy for PIF 
investment is top-down; it begins with MbS.472 Any independence of the PIF is 
superficial. The lacking fund independence increases the risk for the US in receiving 
investment from the PIF. 
 
Projections of Future Growth  
From 2014 to 2017 the PIF’s assets were depleted significantly.473 In order to 
keep money flowing into the fund, the Saudi government planned to sell government 
assets and privatize Saudi Aramco in an initial public offering.474 The IPO has not 
occurred yet, but the Saudi government is still determined to increase the holdings of the 
PIF.475 SAMA is set to relinquish some of its control of cash reserves to PIF.476 The goal 
is to increase the PIF’s assets under management to US $600 billion by 2020 and to US 
$2 trillion by 2030. By 2020 the IMF projects PIF assets will be 52% of GDP (SAR 1.5 
trillion).477  
The rapid accumulation of assets by the fund since 2016 caused concerns that the 
fund was not properly conducting its due diligence.478 The Saudi government made it a 
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national economic priority to increase the assets of the fund.479 The rise in oil prices in 
2018 increased foreign reserves and brought more funds to the PIF.480 The IMF notes that 
the increased role of the PIF and delays in privatization could crowd out the private 
sector due to the increase in the role of the government in the economy.481 Increased 
assets of the PIF also increases the Saudi monarchy’s increased economic power 
domestically and internationally.  
 
Domestic Constraints 
Saudi Arabia has significant domestic constraints on the use of its fund 
internationally. While Saudi Arabia is the largest oil exporter, it also has the highest 
population.482 Consequently, more money is needed to fund government budgets and less 
is left for international investments. Saudi Arabia’s reserves were low following the Gulf 
War of the 1990s and oil price volatility.483 In the face of dwindling foreign reserves 
following the drop in oil prices in 2015, Saudi Arabia endeavored to transfer more money 
from government assets into the PIF.484 The success of the Saudi economy and the assets 
the SWF holds are highly dependent on oil prices.  
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Debt is also a problem for the fund.485 The Saudi government suffers from large 
budget deficits.486 Saudi Arabia as a debtor nation is a constraint on its SWF.487 A lack of 
sufficient funding resulted in the PIF taking out a US $11 billion loan in 2018.488 The 
fund’s willingness to take on debt demonstrates that the Saudi government is facing 
legitimacy challenges domestically.489 The government is facing pressure to see more 
yields from the fund in order to secure against falling oil reserves.490 The need for 
economic diversification and domestic development limits the amount Saudi Arabia can 
invest outside of the country.491 Moreover, the use of leverage by the fund is concerning 
as no other SWF raises debt to fund its investments.492  The domestic constraints of the 
PIF contribute to the stability risks of the fund and its international investments. 
However, debt and government financing constraints have yet to restrict the PIF from 
investing in US companies.  
 
5.3 Geopolitical Motives 
Constraints 
Saudi Arabia took a conservative approach to its investments in the past due to 
political considerations. Following the September 2001 terrorist attack on the US in 
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which 15 out of the 19 hijackers of the commercial airliners involved were Saudi citizens, 
some private Saudi investors saw their US accounts frozen.493 The concern over Saudi 
involvement in the US caused the kingdom to refrain from making risky or conspicuous 
investments in the US in the years following the attack. Saudi Arabia also did not want to 
draw attention to its growing foreign reserves during times of high oil prices because of 
fears of antagonizing anti-Saudi sentiment.494 The management of Saudi sovereign 
wealth also has historical ties with the US. The first governor of SAMA, George A. 
Blowers, was a US citizen.495 Consequently, geopolitical conditions previously restricted 
risky and conspicuous Saudi investment in the US.  
Furthermore, Saudi Arabia is one of the largest holders of US debt.496 The 
majority of Saudi assets are held in dollar-denominated assets. Because of the high 
degree of investment in the US dollars, the Saudi economy is tied to the success of the 
US economy. 497 The Saudi riyal is pegged to the US dollar, and consequently, the Saudi 
government must maintain enough foreign reserves to defend that peg.498 There are 
multiple incentives for Saudi Arabia to avoid decisions that could destabilize the dollar. 
Because of these considerations, it would be against Saudi self-interest to threaten the 
economic or national security of the US.  
 
Vision 2030  
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The PIF engages in the internal accumulation of power as it aims to transform 
domestic economic development.499 Crown Prince Mohammed marked the PIF as the 
primary vehicle to achieve the goals of Saudi Arabia’s Vision 2030.500 Vision 2030 is a 
plan created under MbS to diversify the economy and create almost a half a million 
jobs.501 The plan is essential for the country given, by 2030, half of the Saudi population 
will be under the age of 25. Educating and placing that generation in jobs are the biggest 
challenges that the country faces. Saudi Arabia previously attempted diversification 
twice, but those attempts were unsuccessful.502 The Prince’s plan will include an increase 
in capital spending by the government.503 The plan designates the PIF as the main vehicle 
to diversify the Saudi Arabian economy and to amass economic power for the 
kingdom.504 The PIF’s central role in Vision 2030 rapidly promoted the fund from largely 
unacknowledged to “one of the world’s most powerful sovereign wealth funds.”505 The 
goal of Vision 2030 was to increase the PIF’s assets to US $2 trillion, which would make 
it the largest SWF in the world, by a large margin.506 With the cancellation of the Saudi 
Aramco IPO, it is unclear how the fund will grow its assets to that extent.  
The direction Saudi Arabia went - increasing the power and wealth of the PIF, a 
state-owned enterprise, in order to jump-start the private sector - is inherently 
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contradictory.507 There is speculation that Vision 2030’s purpose is not just reform, but 
also to help MbS to accumulate power.508 The Prince’s ambitious political behavior 
within Saudi Arabia and internationally with the deployment of the PIF’s assets 
reinforces this idea. The speed at which MbS is attempting to make these reforms is 
concerning.509 Diversification of an oil-dependent economy is difficult and happens over 
a long period of time.510 The short timeline of the plan makes it unlikely that the reforms 
will succeed. The ambiguous motives behind the purpose of Vision 2030 and the PIF’s 
role in the plan could call into question the validity of the PIF’s international investments.  
 
Strategic Sectors  
  Before the 2008 financial crisis, Western countries banned SWFs from investing 
in strategic sectors like ports, oil companies, and the defense industry.511 After the image 
of SWFs improved due to their actions during the crisis, those policies changed. In the 
Vision 2030 mandate for the PIF, the fund is specifically deployed to invest in 
international strategic assets.512 The PIF’s target of investment in strategic sectors is 
especially visible in the US because of heavy investment in the US technology sector.  
Saudi interest in strategic sectors stems from its goal to grow and diversify its 
economy. Management of the PIF indicated its desire to invest in robotics and artificial 
                                               
507 Karen E. Young, "Spending to Grow in Saudi Arabia," The Arab Gulf States Institute in Washington, 
August 10, 2018. 
508 Ghafar.  
509 Ghafar.  
510 Ghafar.  
511 Javier Canapé, Ruth V. Aguilera, and Javier Santiso, "Spain and Sovereign Wealth Funds," in The 
Oxford Handbook of Sovereign Wealth Funds (New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 2018). 
512 Katie Paul and Andrew Torchia, "Saudi Arabia Spends Money to Make Money In Foreign Investment 
Drive," Reuters, March 22, 2017, accessed March 21, 2019, https://www.reuters.com/article/saudi-asia-
investment/saudi-arabia-spends-money-to-make-money-in-foreign-investment-drive-idUSL5N1GX1BE. 
127 
 
intelligence in the near future.513 These are two technological strategic sectors and could 
also be considered national defense-related sectors as well.  So far, the PIF has poured 
billions of dollars into the US technology sector. Because of its heavy presence, the 
actions and success of the PIF will have implications for Silicon Valley.  
Saudi Arabia’s investments in strategic sectors flip its relationship with the US. 
Oil monopolizes strategic sectors in Saudi Arabia. The US has been involved with the 
Saudi Arabian oil industry since 1933 when the Chevron won a contract to explore the 
area for sixty years.514 Now Saudi Arabia invests in two of the most vital sectors of the 
US economy: financial and technology. The shift in the power of investment does not 
bode well for US foreign policy and national security because of the importance of 
keeping Saudi Arabia within the US’s sphere of influence. If Saudi Arabia acquires the 
advantage in the US-Saudi economic relationship, the US will have fewer tools available 
to execute its foreign policy in the Middle East as well as secure its energy supply.  
 
International Influence  
MbS uses the PIF as a tool to accumulate and wield international influence. He 
claims there “will be no investment, movement or development in any region of the 
world without the vote of the Saudi sovereign wealth fund.”515 MbS’s goal of making the 
PIF one of the biggest SWFs in the world is self-motivated. As chair of the fund, the 
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more assets the PIF holds, the more power MbS wields. SWFs are also status symbols in 
the international system.516 They symbolize growth and progress for the home country. 
The absence of a Saudi Arabia SWF in the past limited its prestige in global investments. 
Launching a newly structured PIF in congruence with Vision 2030 elevated the status of 
the fund, Saudi Arabia, and MbS.  
 SWF investment allows Saudi Arabia additional political leverage.517 After the 
murder of US resident and Washington Post journalist Jamal Khashoggi in 2018, Saudi 
business ties made it politically difficult for the US to impose sanctions on Saudi 
Arabia.518 While PIF investment in the US was not the only reason for the US not 
imposing sanctions, the increasing business ties the fund promotes between the two 
countries increased barriers. The PIF has, in some ways, increased Saudi Arabia’s access 
and relationship with US officials. Saudi Arabia made announcements of PIF investments 
in US companies during diplomatic events; its investment in Blackstone was announced 
during President Trump’s first state visit to Saudi Arabia. Its investment in Uber was 
planned during a barbecue in Riyadh that Uber policy head David Plouffe, a former 
White House official, attended.519 
The PIF has increased MbS’s business clout internationally. In 2016, MbS was 
unable to secure a meeting with Tesla’s CEO Elon Musk while he was touring the US.520 
After the PIF heavily invested in Tesla, Musk claimed the PIF’s financial support would 
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help him take the company private, signaling a rapid change in the power dynamic 
between the two.521 As the fund’s importance grew, so did MbS’s ability to influence 
international business decisions. The PIF both internally and externally increases Saudi 
Arabia’s power relative to others.  
 
Political Importance  
The PIF’s central role in Vision 2030 and its responsibility for diversifying the 
economy away from oil make controlling the fund a strategic necessity for MbS.522 Hard 
economic times led to the government’s loss of political power in the past. During the 
mid-1980s and 1990s, oil revenues could not keep up with the increasing Saudi 
population and it led to high unemployment and a declining GDP.523 The economic 
decline during that time provoked reformist and jihadist challenges to the government.524 
Furthermore, the PIF allows MbS almost complete control over the domestic 
economy and internally increases his power. Other firms that want to invest in Saudi 
Arabia will need to compete with the PIF’s dominance, crowding out potential private 
investments.525 Firms that receive investment from the PIF are favored by the state, and 
this funding increases MbS’s leverage over private companies in Saudi Arabia.526  
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But with the great political importance of the PIF for MbS, comes a great political 
risk. If the PIF does not bring significant diversification and create new private sectors 
jobs in the country, rising unemployment and increased pressure on the government for 
public sector jobs could result.527 Sustaining the current level of government spending 
has recently been more difficult in the face of decreasing oil prices and an increasing 
Saudi population.528 Putting so much emphasis on the PIF could result in public disdain 
for MbS if the project fails.529 The PIF’s ability to influence domestic politics and the 
strength of the Saudi government makes it a risk to the stability of the country. Saudi 
Arabian stability is essential and the failure of the fund could create instability in the 
Middle East. Whereas the continued success of the PIF increases the power of the 
autocratic MbS regime and creates different geopolitical issues for the US.  
 
Partnerships 
In October 2018, the PIF joined the Russia-China Investment Fund (RCIF).530 
The joint SWF served as an “open cooperation platform” since its establishment in 
2012.531 According to the RDIF website, the RCIF “aims to develop bilateral economic, 
trade, and investment relations between Russia and China.” The RDIF announced the PIF 
contributed US $500 million to become the Russian-Chinese-Saudi Investment Fund with 
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a total of US 2.5 billion of capital.532 The announcement occurred while the Saudi 
Arabian government faced criticism and boycotts from countries around the world due to 
their involvement in the murder of journalist Jamal Khashoggi. Russian President, 
Vladimir Putin, said there was not enough information regarding the murder to justify 
cutting financial ties with Saudi Arabia.533  
Previously, the joint fund focused on investment in strategic sectors such as 
forestry, infrastructure, and finance.534 The alignment of these countries’ SWFs increases 
their economic and political clout. Dr. Theodore Karasik, a senior advisor at a 
geopolitical risk consultancy firm, emphasized a need to watch the joint partnership 
because of its interest in artificial intelligence and its application to security.535 All three 
countries have non-democratic governments and large state-owned sectors, which causes 
their strengthened economic partnership to provide a more powerful alternative to the US 
model of free markets. The RCIF symbolized the increasing partnership between China 
and Russia in the face of US hostility towards both countries. Joining the partnership 
signals Saudi Arabia’s alignment with the partnership aimed at reducing US power. 
There is a clear geopolitical motive of Saudi Arabia joining the partnership. The 
alignment of these three nations’ SWFs is symbolic of the growing threat of SWFs to the 
US. All three are autocratic countries that have recently challenged the US’s power on 
the global stage. The external increasing of power among these countries seems to 
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directly correspond with their transition away from the US. A joining of these economic 
powerhouses is contrary to the interests of the US and its ability to have a dominant 
international influence.  
 
5.4 US Investments  
Technology 
The PIF recently announced its decision to open an office in San Francisco in 
order to attract holdings in the technology sector.536 In 2016, the PIF invested US $3.5 
billion in Uber, a stake with a valuation of US $62.5 billion. The investment mutually 
benefitted both parties. On the side of Saudi Arabia, the investment signaled its status as 
an innovative investor by investing in a popular technology company. For Uber, the PIF’s 
position as a long-term investor ensured the company’s access to capital.537 The PIF’s 
investment in Uber kicked off the fund’s spending spree after a relatively quiet history.538 
It also signaled that the PIF would not be a passive investor. The CEO of the fund, Yasir 
Al-Rumayyan, joined Uber’s board after the investment.539 While it is not uncommon for 
large stake owners to take positions on company boards, it is significant when that stake 
owner is employed by a foreign government. Active SWF investors have greater 
influence in the US through their control of the direction of US companies. As a result, 
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Saudi Arabia’s active investment in Uber poses a greater potential threat to US national 
security.  
The PIF invested US $2 billion in Tesla, obtaining a 4.9% stake in the company. 
The investment in such a high-profile and high-tech company increased scrutiny of the 
fund.540 Additional scrutiny of the fund resulted when the CEO of Tesla, Elon Musk, 
claimed the PIF would provide the funding needed to take the company private.541 That 
statement caused the SEC to sue Tesla for securities fraud.542 Public attention to the PIF 
increased after the scandal as well as decreased the value of Tesla shares.543 The PIF’s 
investment in Tesla once again drew attention when the PIF hedged exposure to its shares 
in January 2019. The hedge happened a day before Tesla announced it would be drawing 
down its employment.544 Tesla shares once again decreased after this development.  
While it is not a US-based firm, Japan’s Softbank Vision Fund received over half 
of its investment from PIF. The Softbank Vision Fund channels most of its assets into US 
technology companies.545 The fund deploys its assets into robotics, artificial intelligence, 
e-commerce, ride-sharing, satellites, and future technology companies.546 These are 
critical and strategic sectors of the economy for defense. The PIF’s investment in this 
industry potentially gives it access to sensitive technology to national defense. Half of the 
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Vision Fund’s assets come from the PIF and so it is likely that the PIF has control in how 
the funds are invested.  
Lucid Motors, an electric car company based Silicon Valley raised US $1 billion 
in financing during September 2018.547 The lead investor of Lucid Motors during that 
time was PIF. Lucid Motors is one of Tesla’s biggest rivals in the electric car industry.548 
The PIF also invested US $400 million in Magic Leap, Inc.549 Magic Leap is a US startup 
that creates 3D imagery and cinematic-reality technology.550 The deal between the 
country and the company came together in six days.551 The speed at which the deal was 
made attracted attention from financiers and entrepreneurs, and when Rumayyan went on 
a tour of California after, he was well sought after.552 
Because of the PIF’s heavy involvement in US technology companies, changes in 
the PIF’s investment strategy could damage this strategic industry.553 As shown by the 
Saudi hedge of Tesla, investment does not always create stable support for companies. 
The PIF is the largest single investor in Silicon Valley.554 All of its investments in high-
tech bestowed the PIF significant power and influence in the sector. High-tech’s status as 
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a strategic sector for both US national and economic security makes the PIF a threat to 
both due to its involvement in the sector.  
 
Blackstone 
The PIF invested US $20 billion in the Blackstone Group’s infrastructure fund.555 
Blackstone’s infrastructure fund aims to upgrade US assets.556 The PIF serves as the 
anchor investment in the new fund.557 Infrastructure is considered a strategic sector and 
Saudi Arabia’s investment in US infrastructure could potentially be a threat to US 
national security. Blackstone’s CEO, Stephen Schwarzman, served as the head of 
Trump’s economic advisory group. The company has significant relationships with SWFs 
as it additionally received investments from the Chinese SWF. Schwarzman had been 
negotiating the deal with the Saudis for a while, but the investment was announced on the 
eve of President Trump's visit to Saudi Arabia in 2017.558 The timing of the 
announcement signals that Saudi Arabia aimed to curry favor with Trump, using the fund 
for a geopolitical motive.  When  President Trump visited Saudi Arabia dozens of US 
business leaders came with him, emphasizing the mix of geopolitics and economics 
between the US and Saudi Arabian governments.559  
 
Media Industry  
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The PIF invested US $200 million in Penske Media Group. The group owns US 
media publications Variety and Women’s Wear Daily.560 The fund was also in talks with 
Endeavor, a Hollywood talent agency. But that investment was later ended due to the 
murder of Washington Post reporter Jamal Khashoggi.561 The PIF’s interest in US media 
industry poses a threat to US security as media has significant impacts on public opinion. 
By wielding influence in this industry, the PIF has a direct channel to shape the views of 
the American public.  
 
5.5 US Concerns 
Corruption  
SWF investments from Saudi Arabia concerns the US because of the nature of 
autocratic regimes.562 Corruption is often a rampant issue within autocratic regimes as 
well as human rights abuses.563 Autocratic ownership of a SWFs raises questions as to the 
public service of the fund.564 The PIF holds vast amounts of assets and it has the potential 
to perpetuate the autocratic regime. The state-owned investment vehicle lacks domestic 
competition.565 There are few barriers to prevent an absolute monarch from using a SWF 
to achieve political objectives. Critics of MbS’s use of the PIF, activists, academics, 
bloggers, and clerics, have been detained.566 Saudi Arabia’s history of human rights 
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violation makes it difficult for the US to defend its economic partnership with the 
country.567 
MbS has almost complete control over Saudi Arabia and the PIF. Investments 
appear to be catered to the interests of the Prince, focusing on tech, tourism, and 
entertainment.568 Deals intended to curry favor with MbS tend to be carried out quickly 
and without proper due diligence.569 The Financial Times described PIF activity from 
2016-2017 as “flashy.”570 In comparison, the Norwegian SWF took years to assemble a 
special team when it decided to move assets into the real estate sector in 2010.571 The 
Norwegian fund manages more assets and boasts several decades of SWF activity.  A 
new SWF, like the PIF, making investments so quickly increases the riskiness of its 
investment activity. 
 
Shift Away from the US  
The emergence of a more active and riskier PIF could cause a movement away 
from Saudi Arabian trade with and investment in the US. The PIF’s financial power 
allows Saudi Arabia to decrease its dependence on the US and attract investment from 
other countries. In May 2017, the PIF created the Saudi Arabian Military Industries.572 
Saudi Arabia is a large purchaser of US weapons and military equipment and the 
establishment of domestic weapons industry in Saudi Arabia is meant to decrease reliance 
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on foreign suppliers.573 The loss of demand from Saudi Arabia for military equipment 
could be damaging for the US defense industry. Saudi Arabia has also started looking for 
investment outside of the US, mostly in Asia.574 Asian countries are interested in 
investing in Saudi Arabia to shore up their supply of energy needed for their rapidly 
growing economies.575 The movement away from US economic influence is concerning 
for the US’s own energy security as well as political influence in Saudi Arabia.  
Saudi Arabia, as an autocratic regime, challenges US capitalist ideals.576 The PIF 
is a state-owned institution and is becoming increasingly dominant in the Saudi 
economy.577 The dominance of the PIF appears to be crowding out the private sector. In 
2017, the private sector only made up 48% of GDP due to stagnating growth, tariffs on 
foreign workers, and electricity price increases.578 In Saudi Arabia, the government drives 
economic activity and employment domestically.579 The more power the PIF accumulates 
for Saudi Arabia, the more US neoliberal ideas are challenged because the country 
becomes more economically powerful.  
In November 2017, the Saudi government launched an “anti-corruption” 
campaign where hundreds of rich and powerful Saudis were held in the Riyadh Ritz 
Carlton hotel.580 A condition for their release was the transfer of cash and assets to the 
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state. The assets would be managed by a state company and cash would be moved to the 
Treasury.581 During the incident, it was reported that Saudi Arabia would place some 
private companies under the custody of the PIF. 582 The “anti-corruption” campaign 
appears to be a self-interested move by MbS to shift economic and financial power from 
the private sector to the public sector. The use of an autocratic regime to transfer private 
assets and cash to state-owned cash and assets is concerning for the US and the 
commitment to protecting systems of democratic capitalism and the right to property.  
 
5.6 The Khashoggi Effect  
PIF’s Connection 
The role of the Saudi Arabian government in the disappearance and murder of 
Washington Post journalist and US resident, Jamal Khashoggi, had short-term 
consequences for the Saudi Arabian SWF.  Negative international perception of the fund 
occurred because MbS chairs the fund and was suspected to have ordered the murder.583 
The murder was predicted to have massive economic effects on Saudi Arabia.584 The 
planned annual conference held by the PIF, “Davos in the Desert,” for its investors and 
investees had a significantly decreased attendance after the scandal broke. Many 
businesses stayed away from the conference in the wake of the murder because of the 
reputation risk of appearing to support the Saudi government.585 Chief executives from 
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Blackstone, Schwarzman, Dimon, and Khostowshahi all canceled their attendance at the 
conference.586 
US companies also felt the backlash from the Khashoggi murder. The PIF is the 
largest investor in Softbank’s Vision Fund. Shares of Softbank’s saw a dramatic drop 
during the height of the controversy and the Vision Fund’s heavy investment in US 
technology firms caused Silicon Valley to feel the effects.587 Khashoggi’s murder 
demonstrated an important concern regarding a state’s involvement in economics that is 
not directly related to SWFs. The Trump Administration refrained from directly putting 
blame on MbS for the murder of Khashoggi. Many people attributed his resistance to the 
massive Boeing arms sale brokered by the administration to the Saudis.588 The more the 
PIF invests in US companies, the more Saudi Arabia can leverage its economic 
importance in the US to prevent punishment for political actions.  
 
Implications 
The PIF lost investments during the backlash of the murder. US talent agency, 
Endeavor, returned the PIF’s US $400 million investment.589 It seemed difficult for the 
PIF to disassociate itself from the controversy at the time with MbS as the figurehead of 
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the fund.590 Like in the aftermath of 9/11, businesses from Western countries became 
wary of investment from Saudi Arabia due to political and optic considerations. US 
attitude toward Saudi Arabia shifted after the Khashoggi incident. Senator Lindsey 
Graham directly implicated MbS as the initiator of the murder.591  But the executive 
branch seemed unmoved by the recent scandal as President Trump maintains a friendly 
relationship with MbS.592  
In March 2019, MbS hired a New York PR firm to repair the image of the PIF 
after the Khashoggi killing.593 The aim of hiring the PR firm is to emphasize the 
commercial objective of the fund and attempt to separate it from the politics of Saudi 
Arabia and MbS.594 But Saudi Arabia felt the effects directly after the Khashoggi 
backlash. FDI into Saudi Arabia declined from $7.45 billion in 2016 to $1.42 billion in 
2017.595 Following the Khashoggi murder, many Western executives that worked for the 
PIF began leaving despite their high pay packages. Finding replacements for them was 
difficult due to the fund’s damaged reputation.596  
The short-term damaging effects of the Khashoggi murder on the PIF demonstrate 
how tightly politics and economics are entangled in Saudi Arabia. The actions of MbS 
not only affect the political reputation of his kingdom, but also the economy’s ability to 
diversify. But President Trump’s continued defense of MbS and denial of the controversy 
weakens the ability of the US to regulate against geopolitical threats from the Saudi 
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SWF. US regulation delegates the power to block foreign investments that threaten 
national security to the president. Without the executive branch acknowledging human 
rights abuses and geopolitical motives, US national security is left vulnerable to SWFs 
controlled by autocrats.  
Furthermore, the lack of definitive action by President Trump punishing Saudi 
Arabia for the murder may have allowed Saudi Arabia’s reputation to not suffer long-
term consequences. Only six months after Khashoggi’s murder, Saudi Aramco raised US 
$12 billion from the debut sale of its international bonds.597 MbS plans to use the 
proceeds from the sale to invest further in technology through the PIF.598 About half of 
the sale went to US investors and a quarter of the sales went to European investors.599 
Additionally, US investment banks Morgan Stanley and JP Morgan brokered the deal.600  
Western participation in the sale signals that there will not be long-term damage to Saudi 
Arabia’s business reputation in the West. MbS and the PIF suffered short-term damage in 
the abandonment of the PIF annual conference, but will not likely see continued 
economic backlash. 
 
5.7 Conclusion  
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The threat from the Saudi Arabian SWF is an explicit danger to US national and 
economic security. Whereas in the past SAMA took a conservative approach to foreign 
investments and tended to make those which enhanced Saudi Arabia’s alliance with the 
US, the current investment strategy of the PIF is much more aggressive. The growing role 
of the PIF in the economy internally increases the power of Saudi Arabia. It also 
reinforces the autocratic power of MbS. Despite the MbS’s vow curb corruption in Saudi 
Arabia, MbS appears to be increasing government corruption by seizing private assets to 
incorporate into the public coffer and ordering the murder of journalists. MbS directly 
controls almost all actions of the PIF, and the growing international and domestic power 
of the fund also increases his power. An empowered Saudi Prince is a threat to the US. 
The loss of power that results from a strong domestic leader in such a strategically 
important country decreases the effectiveness of the US’s Middle East and global foreign 
policy.  
Not only is the aggression of the Saudi SWF a threat to the US’s national security, 
but it is also a threat to economic stability. The increasing economic ties between the two 
countries that the PIF promotes, ties the trajectory of the US economy to the Saudi 
economy.601 Military arms purchases from Saudi Arabia are important to the US 
economy, and recently Saudi Arabia has been increasingly purchasing weapons from 
Russia. A SWF that promotes a transition away from purchasing US arms could be 
damaging for the industry. Furthermore, the increasing ties between Russia and Saudi 
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Arabia that the PIF contributes to also threatens the US’s sphere of influence in the 
Middle East. 
These arms purchases from Russia represent Saudi Arabia’s effort to increase 
security diversification, but also as a form of political leverage.602 The leverage appears 
successful as no sanctions were enacted on Saudi Arabia after the murder of journalist 
Jamal Khashoggi and six months later the large sale of Saudi Aramco bonds indicates 
there will be no major long-term economic damage. President Trump cited the large 
weapons sale to Saudi Arabia as his reason for not punishing the country. As the PIF 
makes more investments in the US, the economic advantage to not punish Saudi Arabia 
for human right violations and corruption increases. US regulation of SWFs for national 
security reasons is primarily at the discretion of the president and President Trump tends 
to prioritize short-term economic gains. PIF investments have been used to curry favor 
with President Trump and signals the fund’s importance in Saudi Arabian-US relations.  
The PIF’s substantial investment in the US strategic technology sector is 
concerning. Not only would Saudi Arabia have access to sensitive information potentially 
relating to defense, but it is an important sector for the health of the US economy. The 
high-tech sector of the US economy makes up 10% of employment and 18% of output.603 
The PIF’s investments tend to be large, risky, and quick. Consequently, the stability and 
validity of those investments are questionable. The threat that the PIF poses to strategic 
US sectors is compounded by the lack of transparency from the Saudi Arabia fund. Saudi 
                                               
602 Young.  
603 United States, Bureau of Labor Statistics, High-Tech Industries: An Analysis of Employment, Wages, 
and Output, by Brian Roberts and Michael Wolf, 7th ed., vol. 7 (2018). 
145 
 
Arabia has more SWF investments in the US than Russia and China combined, causing 
even greater concern for the PIF’s lack of transparency. 
While the PIF might be a new figure in the international system, its splashy 
investments and central role in Vision 2030 makes in an active and driving participant. 
The PIF’s fate is linked to the actions of MbS. While the Prince’s reputation incurred a 
temporary setback due to his involvement in the murder of Khashoggi, the Prince 
continues on his quest to consolidate power domestically and grow influence 
internationally. In order to do this, he will use his control over the PIF to achieve his 
goals. A SWF controlled by the whims of an autocratic leader in the Middle East is a 
pressing threat to US national and economic security.  
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Chapter 6: Policy Recommendations & Conclusions  
6.1 Introduction 
Contrary to the general consensus in 2008 that SWFs are not a geopolitical threat, 
evidence from Russia, China, and Saudi Arabia prove some are. Allowing investment 
from SWFs owned by adversary countries or countries with competing economic 
ideologies pose significant risks to national and economic security. Risks emerge from 
foreign countries engaging in US private markets and the US must equip itself to defend 
against them.604 Current US regulation and soft international law governing SWFs are 
insufficient to protect US interests. No two SWFs are the same in operation, governance, 
strategy, or structure. As a result, US evaluation of the threats of SWFs must allow for an 
individual approach to assessing the risk of each SWF.  
Blocking all investment in the US from SWFs is not an option. Not all SWFs are 
bad actors that threaten the national or economic security of the US. The US should 
encourage investment from transparent and accountable SWFs, like Norway’s fund. Nor 
is every investment of the RDIF, CIC, or PIF geopolitically motivated. Sealing the US off 
from all SWF investment prevents the US from benefitting from the large amount of 
capital SWFs manage. Furthermore, heavily regulating SWFs can be viewed as a form of 
financial protectionism and could be retaliated against by banning FDI by US firms. The 
US needs a new approach to combat the threats SWFs pose to the US, but it needs one 
that does not impose excessive barriers to SWF investment in the US.  
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 This chapter will first review the findings from the threat assessment of SWFs and 
the three case studies, discussing the commonalities among the case studies and 
describing the deficiency of SWF regulations. Next, it will address the findings of the 
study by making policy recommendations such as: creating a new CFIUS arm, publishing 
rankings and grades, and implementing a third-party international assessment of 
compliance with the Santiago Principles.  Finally, this chapter will explain the 
conclusions of this study and its implications.  
 
6.2 Findings  
Commonalties  
The three case studies of SWFs exhibited five commonalities. First, they act 
geopolitically against the US. US National security is threatened when countries use 
SWFs as geopolitical tools. Chapter 2 argued SWFs have high potential to be used as a 
tool to achieve geopolitical goals. Evidence of that assessment was presented in the 
examination of the Russian, Chinese, and Saudi Arabian SWFs. The Russian SWFs’ 
geopolitical threat to the US is quieted at present due to sanctions on RDIF that restrict 
investment in the US. But Russia’s external maximizing of power through international 
partnerships with SWFs, such as Turkey, indicates Russia uses their SWF indirectly to 
achieve geopolitical goals that are against US interests. China uses the CIC to help fund 
the BRI, which has an explicit geopolitical motive, and to bolster its soft power ability at 
the expense of US soft power. Saudi Arabia uses the PIF to curry favor with President 
Trump and increase MbS’s international influence. Russia, China, and Saudi Arabia all 
employ their SWFs as a tool of diplomacy. The US does not have such a tool and is put at 
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a disadvantage. All three provide a precedent for the geopolitical use of SWFs against the 
interests of the US.  
Second, the RDIF, CIC, and PIF lack independence from government. The most 
cogent indicator that SWFs have the potential to be used as geopolitical weapons is the 
funds’ lack of independence. All three SWF case studies demonstrated that a lack of 
independence from the government causes the fund to be manipulated to achieve the 
goals of the government or leader. The Santiago Principles recommend that SWFs have 
legal independence from home countries, but in practice, SWFs in autocratic countries 
have very little independence. The three autocrats examined in the case studies, Putin, Xi, 
and MbS, all have significant control over the strategy of their respective SWFs. When 
the SWF is not far removed from government control, it is likely that the fund will be 
used to achieve geopolitical objectives.   
Third, SWFs in Russia, China, and Saudi Arabia all express a strong desire to 
invest in US companies, especially in the technology and financial sectors. The RDIF 
worked to overcome sanctions in order to pursue investment in Hyperloop. Since 2008, 
the CIC invests heavily in US financial institutions. Silicon Valley’s largest single 
investor is the PIF. Favorable public opinion, consequently, is important for these SWFs 
to have access to US markets. Additionally, the companies that SWFs want to invest in 
are part of strategic sectors. The concentration of SWF investment in strategic sectors 
perpetuates the threat of economic destabilization and technology transfers that could be 
harmful to US national security.  
Fourth, all three SWFs, the RDIF, the CIC, and the PIF, struggle with public 
image issues that sometimes inhibit their ability to invest in the US. The RDIF is 
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sanctioned because of Russia’s meddling in the 2016 election and annexation of Crimea 
and the fund is considered suspicious by the US. The CIC’s negative public image issues 
derive from a general distrust of Chinese investment in the US, as demonstrated by 
CNOOC’s failed investment in Unocal. While the murder of Saudi journalist Khashoggi 
did not ultimately damage Saudi Arabia’s business ties with the West, it did cause a 
public backlash for the PIF and the termination of its investment in Endeavor. The CEOs 
of the RDIF and CIC have repeatedly assured the Western media that their investments 
are not politically motivated. The PIF hired a PR firm in response to the Khashoggi 
murder to rebuild its public image. SWFs care about their public image because a 
negative one restricts their ability to invest abroad.  
Lastly, the case studies proved that SWFs have the ability to internally and 
externally increase the power of home countries, sometimes at the expense of the US. 
Russia’s RF financed government deficits to maintain the popularity of the Putin 
Administration and it reduced the effects of US sanctions meant to punish the 
government’s aggression abroad. The CIC’s many investments in US financial 
institutions affords them influence in the US. The PIF’s investments in domestic military 
arms production and large investments in Silicon Valley negatively affect the US’s ability 
to have influence in or punish Saudi Arabia. The increase in the potential to wield soft 
power through investments threatens the US’s effective use of its own soft power.  
China’s use of its SWF as part of its “going global” campaign that leverages economic 
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heft to increase its global influence attempts to compete with the US’s global 
influence.605  
Partnerships between SFWs are a way of externally accumulating power to 
challenge the economic power and ideological dominance of the US. This phenomenon is 
especially apparent in the creation of the Russia-China-Saudi Cooperation Fund. China 
and Russia’s use of cooperation funds limit the ability of the US to impose broad 
regulation on funds it deems unfriendly to US interests. The RDIF’s partnerships with 
OPEC SWFs threatens the US sphere of influence in the Middle East as well as the US’s 
energy security. Both the ability to internally and externally increase power for SWF 
home countries reduces US power in the global arena.  
 
Insufficient Regulation  
  All three case studies demonstrate that current international and domestic 
regulation of SWFs is insufficient to guard against economic and national security 
threats. The Santiago Principles guides SWFs to avoid the main problems of SWFs that 
lead to threats of national and economic security: lack independence and transparency. 
But, in all three case studies, SWFs exhibit a lack of independence and transparency. The 
Santiago Principles lack an enforcement mechanism which permits SWFs to behave in 
the way they chose without major consequences. It allows autocratic leaders in Russia, 
China, and Saudi Arabia to operate partially geopolitically motivated SWFs. Publically 
                                               
605 Minxin Pei, "China in Xi’s “New Era”: A Play for Global Leadership," Journal of Democracy, no. 2 
(2018): 38-51. 
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posted self-evaluations permit SWFs to provide evidence that they are legally compliant 
to the Santiago Principles when they are not in practice.  
Domestic regulation of SWFs fails to produce proper awareness of the threats of 
SWFs. Grouping SWFs investments with private foreign investments under broad 
domestic regulation is insufficient. Public entities and private entities have different 
investment goals. Public investment vehicles are much more vulnerable to exploitation 
for geopolitical purposes than private investment vehicles are. The US’s relationship with 
the home country matters more in assessing the risk of investment from SWFs than 
private foreign investment. Moreover, SWFs are a unique and relatively new financial 
innovation and grouping them with all other foreign investors decreases understanding 
and awareness of the different threats they pose. Failure to understand or be aware of the 
Russia-China joint investment fund’s relationship to VEB allowed the RDIF to invest in 
the US despite sanctions on VEB.  
Enforcement of domestic regulation is dependent on the president making the 
decision to block investments from SWFs that threaten national security. Dependence on 
the executive also causes the relationship of the executive with foreign countries and fund 
officials to affect the president’s decision. This was demonstrated by both the CIC’s and 
PIF’s investments in Blackstone, whose CEO was a Trump economic advisor. This 
encourages the use of SWFs as a tool to earn favor with the administration and to serve a 
geopolitical purpose. Saudi Arabia’s use of PIF investment to curry favor with President 
Trump contributed to his failure to discipline Saudi Arabia for Khashoggi’s murder. 
President Trump is highly motivated by short-term economic gains, and SWF investment 
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can be used to influence US foreign policy. Without a second SWF watchdog, the US 
regulation of SWFs is entirely left up to the president to enforce.  
 
6.3 Policy Recommendations 
A New CFIUS Arm  
An amendment to the CFIUS mandate establishing a new board that specifically 
investigates investment from SWFs would address some of the threats of SWFs. 
Regulation that provides oversight for private foreign companies wishing to invest in the 
US is currently the same as regulation for public foreign companies. Private and public 
companies are guided by different motivations and governance, and as a result their 
investment outcomes and risk are different. Consideration of whether the home 
government of a SWF is “hostile” to the US or does not align with US interests is 
important when evaluating a potential SWF investment.  A specialized body to review 
investments from SWFs would be more equipped to assess the unique risk that they pose.  
A second amendment to CFIUS that informs both the president and the House and 
Senate Foreign Relations Committee of CFIUS’s findings in assessing SWF investments 
increases vigilance of the SWF threats. Current domestic regulation of SWFs only 
permits the president to receive information about CFIUS’s findings and only the 
president can make the decision to block investment from a foreign entity. Expanding the 
scope of awareness to the legislative branch increases the probability that investments 
that threaten US security will be addressed. A new SWF CFIUS arm aims to increase 
awareness of SWFs and their potential threats. SWFs in an era of hybrid warfare are a 
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new challenge and government acknowledgment of their threats are few after initial 
hearings in 2007-2008.  
 
Published Rankings and Grades  
The public image of SWFs has an effect on their access to US markets. A US 
regulatory body like CFIUS should publically publish rankings and grades for SWFs, 
evaluating their transparency, independence, and compliance with the Santiago 
Principles. The rankings should aim to have similar effects as the World Bank’s Ease of 
Doing Business Index; a SWF’s ranking should indicate how favorably the US views 
investment from that SWF. It would provide both a resource for companies accepting or 
courting investment from SWFs. Additionally, it would create an incentive for home 
countries to improve their adherence to the Santiago Principles and not to pursue 
geopolitical goals using SWFs. Indicators of when SWF investment in the US might be 
motivated by geopolitical motives are:   
• Investment by US (economic and political) adversaries 
• Investment from funds with a low degree of independence 
• Investment by autocratic countries 
• Investment in strategic sectors 
• Investments in non-commercially sound sectors 
• Active investments rather than passive investments  
• Investments when the timing lines up with political events  
• Investments in companies that have ties to the US government  
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Rankings quantify the risks from these qualities and raise awareness of potential 
geopolitically motivated SWFs.  
The most applicable and feasible enforcement mechanism for international 
regulation of SWFs in the US is to increase indicators for host countries when SWFs are 
not adhering to the Santiago Principles. According to a study completed at the University 
of Pennsylvania Law School, states respond to public rankings and adjust policies and 
regulations to receive more favorable rankings.606 Publically publishing rankings that can 
help the US determine whether a country is acting geopolitically or adversely to national 
or economic security could help domestically enforce the Santiago Principles. Moreover, 
it would also enforce regulation without discouraging investment in the US by creating 
more barriers to investment.  
Allowing the market to punish and reward SWFs based on their compliance with 
regulation would prevent the US from appearing hostile to SWF investment and losing 
out on potential sources of capital. SWFs want to invest in the US, especially in the high-
tech and financial sectors. SWFs are also concerned about their public image due to a bad 
public image’s ability to diminish investment opportunities. If the US publically graded 
SWFs, it would incentivize SWFs with bad grades to reform in order to invest in the US 
without suspicion or rejection from the president. 
Some ranking systems of SWFs exist. The Truman Scoreboard ranks SWFs based 
on their compliance with the Santiago Principles. But the scoreboard is published by the 
Peterson Institute of International Economics, not a domestic or international regulatory 
                                               
606 Ruth Doshi, Judith G. Kelley, and Beth A. Simmons, "The Power of Ranking: The Ease of Doing 
Business Indicator and Global Regulatory Behavior," Faculty Scholarship at Penn Law 2043 (2019). 
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body. As a result, the rankings are not as effective at influencing the behavior of SWFs, 
nor are they tailored to the threat each fund poses specifically to the US. The Truman 
Scoreboard was conceived by an individual SWF scholar, Edwin Truman, not the overall 
Peterson Institute of International Economics. While the scoreboard is a good start to 
ranking SWFs, it is not sufficient. Rankings of SWFs by private institutions can be 
effective, but they need to be widespread and comprehensive enough. If a large nonprofit 
were to rank SWFs it would have similar usefulness as the US government ranking 
SWFs. 
For example, the Linaburg-Maduell Transparency Index, which is published by 
the Sovereign Wealth Fund Institute, influenced the CEO of the CIC. He pledged to reach 
the same ranking on the index as the Norwegian fund on the television show “60 
Minutes” in 2008.607 Additionally, the transparency of SWFs in aggregate has been 
steadily increasing.  Public rankings of SWFs result in comparison to the Norwegian 
fund, which is the gold standard of compliance with the Santiago Principles. Publicly 
published rankings on Santiago Principles compliance sends a more effective message to 
SWFs that their investments need to be commercially motivated. 
 
Third-Party International Evaluation  
The IMF needs to be more involved in the running of the IFSWF. Allowing SWFs 
to police themselves is not sufficient to prevent SWFs from acting geopolitically. SWFs 
are an effective tool in accomplishing the geopolitical goals of the home country quietly. 
                                               
607 Report to Congress of the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, by Wortzel Larry, 
110th Cong., 2d sess., Cong. Rept. (2008). 
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Without a proper governing body, home countries have few external barriers in using 
SWFs to accomplish non-commercial goals. A way to incentivize compliance with the 
Santiago Principles is to publish evaluations completed by the IMF, rather than self-
evaluations. 
Currently, the IFSWF publishes self-evaluations of SWFs’ compliance with the 
Santiago Principles. All three countries, Russia, China, and Saudi Arabia declare their 
fund is in line with the transparency and independence guidelines through self-
evaluations. In practice, they do not adhere to those guidelines. Mandating third-party 
assessments of adherence to those guidelines as a prerequisite to IFSWF membership 
would increase incentives to follow those guidelines. Moreover, failing to become a 
member of the IFSWF would be a signal to host countries that a SWF is not governed by 
the Santiago Principles. Third-party evaluations will be more accurate and less dependent 
on the interpretation of the home country.  
 
Inability of Policy to Address Soft Power Concerns 
There is no single policy fix to address the threat to US hegemony. The threat 
results from the increase in soft power projection that SWFs cultivate, especially in 
countries that promote economic ideologies contrary to that of the US. A shift in 
economic power from the West to the East is possibly the greatest threat that SWFs pose 
to the US. Confronting the emerging threat requires major structural political and 
economic changes. One of these changes include less isolationism. Isolationist foreign 
policy contributes to the reduction of US soft power and created a vacuum for countries 
like China to fill the void in structuring the global economy. The US also needs 
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awareness of its domestic economic ailments that increase the threat of SWFs: 
macroeconomic imbalances and failure to diversify energy supply.608 Solutions to those 
problems, such as energy independence and achieving positive net exports, are difficult to 
implement and happen over a long period of time. But awareness of the shift in power 
away from the US advanced by SWFs is the first step in addressing the challenges.   
 
6.4 Conclusions  
 Contrary to previous assessments of SWFs prior to the 2008 financial crisis, 
SWFs do pose a geopolitical threat to the US. Evidence of leveraging of SWF investment 
to increase international influence is found in Russia, China, and Saudi Arabia. In light of 
these findings, the US approach to addressing the threat of SWFs needs adjustment.   
However, even if regulation was strengthened, the use of SWFs for geopolitical 
motives would not be completely eliminated. Even if the independence and transparency 
of SWFs are increased, autocrats in home countries will still want to use SWF as a tool of 
foreign policy. SWFs will continue to pose threats the US simply due to their mere 
existence in different countries and regimes. The goal of future US investigations into 
SWFs should be to increase awareness of the geopolitical motives of individual SWFs. A 
higher level of awareness allows the US to more effectively regulate SWFs when they 
pose a threat to national or economic security without hampering the benefits they could 
bring to the US economy. Future research into the effect that SWFs have on the US 
should also focus on the effects they have on democracy promotion and US soft power. 
                                               
608 Daniel W. Drezner, The Foreign Policy Implications of Sovereign Wealth Funds. Prepared Testimony 
for the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, June 11, 2008. 
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 Unlike the threats from Japanese FDI in 1980, the threats of SWFs are unlikely to 
dissipate quickly. As the demand for oil and other natural resources increase and large 
current account surpluses persist, SWFs will continue to grow in size and pervasiveness. 
Additionally, economics and finance will play an increasing role in foreign relations, 
amplified by the growing importance of SWFs. As the rise of sovereign wealth funds 
advances the shift in economic and political power from the West to the East, it is 
imperative that the United States understand the effects they have on its ability to operate 
as a hegemon in the international political economy. 
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Appendix: List of Acronyms 
 
BRI: Belt and Road Initiative  
CFIUS: The Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States 
CIC: Chinese Investment Corporation  
CNOOC: China National Offshore Oil Corporation  
CPC: Communist Party of China 
FEC: Federal Elections Committee 
FEM: Fondo de Estabilizacion Macroeconomic (Venezuela)  
FINSA: Foreign Investment and National Security Act of 2018 
FIRRMA: Foreign Investment Risk Review Modernization Act 
GCC: Gulf Cooperation Council  
GDP: Gross Domestic Product  
IFI: International Financial Institution  
IFSWF: International Forum of Sovereign Wealth Funds  
IMF: International Monetary Fund  
IPO: Initial Public Offering  
IWG: International Working Group of Sovereign Wealth Funds  
MbS: Crowned Prince Mohammed bin Salman of Saudi Arabia  
MOF: Ministry of Finance 
NATO: North Atlantic Treaty Organization  
NWF: National Wealth Fund (Russia)  
OECD: Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development  
OPEC: Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries 
PAC: Political Action Committee 
PBoC: People’s Bank of China 
PIF: Public Investment Fund (Saudi Arabia)  
RF: Reserve Fund (Russia)  
RCIF: Russia-China Investment Fund 
RDIF: Russian Direct Investment Fund 
RMB: Renminbi  
RUB: Russian Ruble  
RSF: Russian Stabilization Fund  
RTA: Regional Trade Agreement 
SAFE: State Administration of Foreign Exchange (China)  
SAMA: Saudi Arabian Monetary Agency  
SAR: Saudi Arabian Riyal  
SEC: US Securities and Exchange Commission  
SOE: State-Owned Enterprise  
SWF: Sovereign Wealth Fund 
UAE: United Arab Emirates 
UN: United Nations  
US: United States  
USD: United States Dollar  
VEB: Vnesheconombank  
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